Brouwer meets Husserl

Cover -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- CH 1 An Informal Introduction -- CH 2 Introduction -- 2.1 The Aim -- 2.2 The Thesis -- 2.3 Motivation -- 2.4 Method, and an Assumption -- 2.5 The Literature -- CH 3 The Argument -- 3.1 Presentation -- 3.2 Comments -- CH 4 The Original Positions -- 4.1 The Incompatibility of Husserl's and Brouwer's Positions -- 4.2 Two Sources of Mutual Pressure -- 4.2.1 Similarity of Methods -- 4.2.2 Initial Plausibility of Both Positions -- 4.3 Resolving the Conflict: The Options, and a Proposal -- 4.3.1 Deny That Some Mathematical Objects are Intratemporal, Dynamic and Unbounded -- 4.3.2 Deny That Mathematical Objects are Omnitemporal -- 4.3.3 Deny That Mathematical Objects are Within the Temporal Realm -- 4.3.4 Deny That Mathematics is About Objects -- 4.3.5 A Proposal: The Heterogeneous Universe -- CH 5 The Phenomenological Incorrectness of the Original Arguments -- 5.1 The Phenomenological Standard for a Correct Argument in Ontology -- 5.2 Husserl's Weak Revisionism -- 5.3 Husserl's Implied Strong Revisionism -- 5.4 The Incompleteness of Husserl's Argument -- 5.4.1 From Atemporality to Omnitemporality -- 5.4.2 Possible Influence of Husserl's Informants -- 5.5 The Irreflexivity of Brouwer's Philosophy -- CH 6 The Constitution of Choice Sequences -- 6.1 A Motivation for Choice Sequences -- 6.2 Choice Sequences as Objects -- 6.3 Choice Sequences as Mathematical Objects -- 6.3.1 The Temporality of Choice Sequences -- 6.3.2 The Formal Character of Choice Sequences -- 6.3.3 The Subject-dependency of Choice Sequences -- CH 7 Application: An Argument for Weak Continuity -- 7.1 The Weak Continuity Principle -- 7.2 An Argument That Does Not Work -- 7.3 A Phenomenological Argument -- CH 8 Concluding Remarks -- Appendix: Intuitionistic Remarks on Husserl's Analysis of Finite Number in the Philosophy of Arithmetic -- Notes -- References -- Name and Citation Index -- Subject Index -- Last Page.