This essay is about how we produce "realities." Scientists think of the world under the "External Reality Paradigm or Postulate" (ERP), whose familiar name is "realism." ERP asserts that our mental representations reflect what "is" out there. One can correct eventual "reading mistakes" by empirical techniques.
Brain-centrism, on the contrary, asserts that our mental representations are not what "is" out there; we perceive our reaction to the external world. We can correct reading errors, but cannot change the structure of the mental space that identifies and understands. One cannot "correct" the fact that we all are human observers. No one has seen the universe neither through non-human eyes, or with a non-human brain.
Recent progress in cognitive neuroscience has forced us to question ERP and distinguish "what is out there" from how our mental space illustrates it.
Brain-centrism argues that our so-called objective "third-party" statements are "first-party" human stories structured according to precise rules. These rules, known as the scientific method, should make sure that knowledge got by respecting them is the best one can expect.
ERP proposes an improbable situation: an isomorphism between "out there" and our representations of "out there." We shall explain all along with this book why this extreme case is so unlikely.
In this first volume, we shall examine the "mental space," an abstract entity generated by the brain's activity. The mental space is the place where we live, feel, believe, desire, fear, and think. Its components are mental representations. We shall examine its relationship with the brain, and its connections with "out there." We shall discuss how language developed and modeled our realities.
