"Anyone reading Philosophical Investigations would do well to keep it by their side, not only for its authoritative commentary on particular passages, but also for Hacker's extremely illuminating essays on the themes of the last part of the book: one each on intentionality, induction, the arbitrariness of grammar, negation, methodology in philosophical psychology, memory and recognition the will, intention and the mythology of meaning." London Review of Books
"It is as good a commentary on the Investigations as seems humanly possible. This will reamin the definitive starting point for the forseeable future. Indeed, it must rank alongside the greatest contributions to philosophical scholarship (such as Ross on Aristotle or Vaihinger on Kant), since it combines, on a momentous scale, authoritative textual exegesis, philosophical insight, encyclopedic knowledge of the historical background and lucidity of expression. Hacker succeeds brilliantly in showing that these passages are essential to the discussion of language and linguistic meaning that is the leitmotif of the Investigations. The chapter on mental states and processes provides an excellent interpretation and defence of Wittgenstein's approach to philosophical psychology, in particular of his denial that our psychological concepts constitute a 'folk psychology' that must be replaced by a more scientific alternative. Similarly, the chapter on will is the most authoritative discussion yet of Wittgenstein's fiendishly difficult treatment of that topic." Hans-Johann Glock, Times Higher Education Supplement
Part I: Intentionality: The Harmony Between Language and Reality (428-65):.
1. Representation In Thought and Speech.
2. The Tractatus: Form and Content.
3. Repudiation of Causal Theories.
4. A Fresh Start.
5. Dispelling The Confusions (Identity and Surrogationalism; Thinking What Is Not The Case; Knowing What One Thinks; Satisfaction and Fitting; Anticipating The Future; Understanding and Interpreting).
Part II: Justification By Experience (466-90):.
6. The Tractatus.
7. Reasons and Reasoning.
8. Justifying Induction.
Part III: The Immanence of Meaning and The Bounds of Sense (491-570):.
The Arbitrariness of Grammar and The Bounds of Sense.
9. Grammar Justified.
10. Grammar Unjustified.
11. Illusory Determinants of The Bounds of Sense.
12. The Arbitrariness of Grammar and The Immanence of Meaning.
13. Traversing The Bounds of Sense.
A Note on Negation 1.
Frege and Russell.
14. The Tractatus Criticisms of Frege.
15. The Meaning Body of Negation.
Part IV: Mental States and Processes (571-610): .
Methodology In Philosophical Psychology.
16. Psychology: A 'Young Science' Or 'Experimental Methods and Conceptual Confusion'?.
17. The Descriptive Method In Philosophical Psychology.
18. The Concepts of Psychology and Their Role In Human Life.
19. The Plan For The Treatment of Psychological Concepts.
20. The Preferred Strategy.
Memory and Recognition.
21. The Prevailing Tradition.
22. Memory: Reading The Past Off The Present.
23. Memory Experiences and Processes.
24. Memory Traces and Psycho-Physical Parallelism.
26. Plus Ca Change.
Part V: The Will (611-28): .
Willing and The Nature of Voluntary Action.
27. Agency and Action.
28. The Prevalent Tradition.
29. 'My Kinaesthetic Sensations Advise Me'.
30. Is Willing Too Merely An Experience?.
32. Fantasies of The Will. (The Innervationist and Ideo-Motor Theories; Trying; Causation of Action).
33. Voluntary and Involuntary Action.
Part VI: Intention and Recollecting One's Intention (629-60): .
34. Stage Setting.
35. Wittgenstein: Remembering What One Was Going To.
36. Wittgenstein: Category Distinctions.
37. Intention and Prediction.
38. The Language Game of 'I Intend'.
Part VII: Meaning Something (661-93): .
The Mythology of Meaning Something.
39. A Puzzle About 661-93.
40. Misconceptions About Meaning In The Notebooks and The Tractatus.
41. The Retrospective Reconstruction of The Mythology of Meaning.
42. The Change of Heart.
43. Categorial Differentiations.
44. Meaning What One Says.
45. Reassembling The Jigsaw.