| Preface | p. xiii |
| The Nature of the Theories | p. 1 |
| The theory of value | p. 1 |
| Some basic features of the concept of value | p. 1 |
| Theories of concepts | p. 4 |
| Grounds for accepting the theory | p. 10 |
| Moral justification | p. 13 |
| Morality and value | p. 13 |
| Public justification | p. 15 |
| Contractualism | p. 18 |
| Remarks on the task of moral theory | p. 19 |
| A Theory of Value | p. 23 |
| Emotion | p. 25 |
| Two theories of emotion | p. 26 |
| The Internal Sensation Theory | p. 26 |
| The Cognitive-Arousal Theory | p. 33 |
| Three versions of CAT | p. 34 |
| Affects | p. 41 |
| Some evidence for discrete affects | p. 41 |
| Some objections and additional evidence | p. 45 |
| Affects and objects | p. 49 |
| Intentional objects | p. 49 |
| The content of emotional states | p. 51 |
| Items in the world | p. 56 |
| Grounding beliefs | p. 57 |
| Appropriateness conditions | p. 64 |
| Appropriate beliefs and objects | p. 64 |
| Emotions and evaluations | p. 69 |
| Stronger appropriateness conditions | p. 74 |
| Valuing | p. 80 |
| What valuing presupposes | p. 81 |
| The affect presupposition | p. 81 |
| Desire presuppositions | p. 84 |
| Needs presuppositions | p. 101 |
| Intrinsic valuing | p. 105 |
| Hedonism and the Affective-Cognitive Theory | p. 105 |
| Affects and attitudes | p. 112 |
| Beliefs about goodness | p. 118 |
| Unworthy emotions and their objects | p. 124 |
| Extrinsic valuing and rational action | p. 126 |
| Intrinsic and instrumental valuing | p. 126 |
| Purely derivative valuings | p. 130 |
| Foundational valuings | p. 140 |
| Value Judgments | p. 145 |
| Simple value judgments | p. 146 |
| The color analogy | p. 146 |
| Externalism and internalism in value theory | p. 153 |
| Impersonal value judgments and action | p. 161 |
| How value judgments can be criticized | p. 165 |
| Extrinsic value judgments | p. 172 |
| Comparative value judgments | p. 173 |
| Comparative valuings | p. 175 |
| Are there impersonal comparative value judgments? | p. 185 |
| Reasons and objectivity | p. 190 |
| Objectivity as impartiality | p. 190 |
| Objectivity as decentering | p. 198 |
| Values and Value Systems | p. 204 |
| Values | p. 204 |
| Abstract valuings | p. 205 |
| Valuational criteria | p. 207 |
| Value orientations | p. 217 |
| Value systems | p. 219 |
| Ambivalence and conflict | p. 219 |
| The coherence of value systems | p. 223 |
| Values, goods, and plans | p. 235 |
| Conclusion to part I | p. 241 |
| The Affective-Cognitive Theory: revisions and retentions | p. 241 |
| The open-question argument | p. 244 |
| Anthropocentrism and the environment | p. 247 |
| A Theory of Moral Justification | p. 251 |
| Value and Moral Reasons | p. 253 |
| Two radical theories | p. 253 |
| The orthodox view | p. 253 |
| Simple Rationalism | p. 261 |
| Value-grounded rationalism (i) | p. 269 |
| VGR and its paradox | p. 269 |
| Solipsism and egocentrism | p. 275 |
| Minimal objectivity | p. 278 |
| Psychopathy | p. 292 |
| Moral personality, habit, and reason | p. 300 |
| Value-grounded rationalism (ii) | p. 306 |
| Consistency and universalizability | p. 306 |
| The first objection: consistency as a value | p. 313 |
| The second objection: the gap between belief and action | p. 315 |
| The third objection: the instrumental interpretation | p. 316 |
| Teleological and Deontological Justification | p. 319 |
| Public justification | p. 319 |
| Moral personality and justification | p. 319 |
| Public morality and justification | p. 322 |
| Contractualism | p. 328 |
| Constrained teleology | p. 329 |
| Contractualism and teleology | p. 329 |
| The common good | p. 334 |
| Common good arguments | p. 336 |
| Community of valuing | p. 337 |
| Harmony | p. 339 |
| Compromise | p. 343 |
| Proceduralism | p. 351 |
| Neutrality and common good arguments | p. 356 |
| Value and deontology | p. 359 |
| The problem of circularity | p. 359 |
| Deontological public justification | p. 362 |
| The rational commitment to both forms of justification | p. 365 |
| Two remaining issues | p. 367 |
| The boundary of the public | p. 367 |
| Moral value | p. 376 |
| The State of Nature | p. 379 |
| The right to natural liberty | p. 379 |
| Deontology and the state of nature | p. 379 |
| The justification of natural liberty | p. 381 |
| Two objections | p. 386 |
| On interpreting "liberty" | p. 390 |
| Paternalism | p. 396 |
| Paternalism and liberty | p. 396 |
| Is paternalism always justified? | p. 399 |
| On further describing the state of nature | p. 404 |
| Moral and political philosophy | p. 404 |
| Property | p. 407 |
| Exchange | p. 416 |
| Harm | p. 420 |
| Needs | p. 423 |
| The Social Contract | p. 429 |
| The state of nature and the social contract | p. 429 |
| Irrational values | p. 429 |
| Immoral proposals | p. 431 |
| The state of nature as a baseline | p. 437 |
| Ideology and compromise | p. 439 |
| Competing ideologies | p. 439 |
| The contractual argument in one-dimensional political space | p. 443 |
| The N-dimensional contractual argument | p. 457 |
| Equal liberty and antiliberal ideologies | p. 466 |
| Distributive justice | p. 470 |
| Concluding remarks | p. 476 |
| A prolegomenon to political philosophy | p. 476 |
| The limits of justification | p. 478 |
| Morality and value in a liberal society | p. 480 |
| Izard's Des Categories and Some Reliability Statistics | p. 484 |
| Desert and Value | p. 485 |
| Bibliography | p. 490 |
| Index | p. 517 |
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