C. S. Peirce, the founder of pragmatism, argued that a true belief is a belief which would be indefeasible - a belief which would stand up to inquiry, were it to be pursued as far as it could fruitfully go. In this book Cheryl Misak argues for and elucidates the pragmatic account of truth, paying attention both to Peirce's texts and to the requirements for a suitable account of truth. An important argument of the book is that we must be sensitive to the difference between offering a definition of truth and engaging in a distinctively pragmatic project. This book spells out the relationship between truth and inquiry; it articulates the consequences of a statement's being true. It shows that the existence of distinct pragmatic enterprise has implications for the status of the pragmatic account of truth and for the way in which philosophy should be conducted.
This new paperback includes a brand new additional chapter, along with a new preface and revised bibliography.
`Review from previous edition This exposition and defense of Peirce's views on truth is clear, well organized, and largely nontechnical. It interacts with a good deal of the recent literature relevant to pragmatism and truth.
P. K. Moser, Choice
`Cheryl Misak has written a clear sensible, and mercifully concise account of a Peircean conception of truth ... an extremely stimulating and thought-provoking book, well worth reading, and sure to generate fruitful discussion in years to come.
Transactions of the C.S. Peirce Society
`the book offers a sustained discussion and is informative concerning ways of understanding Peirce's views on truth.
Review of Metaphysics
`It is good to have a lucid, intelligent, and accurate account of Peirce's pragmatic theories of truth and inquiry. Cheryl Misak's book provides us with such an account. It is also good to see Peirce's theory of truth presented sympathetically in relation to his general theories of logic and metaphysics. Misak's book does this too. It deals authoritatively with Peirce's more general philosophical position, and shows clearly how Peirce's theory of truth is
related to it. The book is one which every student of American pragmatism should own. Cheryl Misak's book is a lucid and well-researched and -presented account of Peirce's pragmatism. As such it is welcome. It is clearly written, and I, for one, have learnt a great deal from reading it.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy
`provocative little book ... As one would expect, it provides suggestive hypotheses about Peirce and challenging philosophical arguments ... the enthusiasm she exhibits for discovering Peirce actively engaged with a topic that is currently vital and controversial is refreshing
The Philosophical Review
`Within the expanding volume of scholarly works on the writings of the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce, Cheryl Misak's study should gain a solid place ... This book will be particularly interesting to Peirce scholars who want to explore Peirce's views on truth or who are following new contributions to this study. Yet since the writing style is very accessible..., and since the book examines a number of topics pursued by Peirce, it will also be
useful as an introduction to Peirce's philosophy.'
2: Inquiry: The Fixation of Belief
4: Objectivity, Bivalence, and Truth
Series: Oxford Philosophical Monographs
Number Of Pages: 232
Published: 1st March 2004
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Country of Publication: GB
Dimensions (cm): 21.5 x 13.7
Weight (kg): 0.28