| List of figures | p. xi |
| Acknowledgments | p. xii |
| Introduction | p. 1 |
| Overview | p. 1 |
| Why a new dynamic theory? | p. 6 |
| Rules of play: the starting point matters | p. 19 |
| Introduction | p. 19 |
| Applying the standard theory | p. 21 |
| Rules of play of TOM | p. 23 |
| Rationality rules and backward induction | p. 27 |
| Interpreting TOM: Samson and Delilah | p. 34 |
| Feasible and infeasible moves | p. 40 |
| The anticipation problem: there may be no resolution | p. 43 |
| Introduction | p. 43 |
| Three different election games | p. 45 |
| Anticipation games | p. 53 |
| The pursuit of the Israelites | p. 57 |
| The anticipation problem in literature | p. 60 |
| Magnanimity: it sometimes pays | p. 67 |
| Introduction | p. 67 |
| Self-restraint by a victim in muggings | p. 70 |
| Different views on the rationality of magnanimity | p. 73 |
| The Magnanimity Game (MG) | p. 75 |
| Applications of MG to historical cases | p. 79 |
| When is sacrifice rational? | p. 83 |
| Moving power: breaking the cycle | p. 85 |
| Introduction | p. 85 |
| Cyclic games and rule 5' | p. 88 |
| Moving power | p. 94 |
| The Revelation Game | p. 102 |
| Bombing campaigns in Vietnam | p. 110 |
| The effects of reputation | p. 117 |
| Order and threat power: eliminating indeterminacy and communicating intentions | p. 121 |
| Introduction | p. 121 |
| The interplay of different kinds of power | p. 124 |
| Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken | p. 127 |
| The Cuban missile crisis: moving and order power | p. 130 |
| Threat power | p. 138 |
| The use of threat power in Poland, 1980-1 | p. 148 |
| Varieties of power | p. 154 |
| Information in games: misperception, deception, and omniscience | p. 157 |
| Introduction | p. 157 |
| Was the Civil War a result of incomplete information? | p. 159 |
| Incomplete information in the Magnanimity Game (MG) | p. 163 |
| Misperception in the Iran hostage crisis | p. 165 |
| Deception in the Cuban missile crisis | p. 170 |
| Information revelation in Hamlet | p. 174 |
| The paradox of omniscience | p. 178 |
| Incomplete information in larger games: a model of negotiations | p. 183 |
| Introduction | p. 183 |
| A negotiation game with a tie-breaker | p. 187 |
| The tie-breaker removed | p. 190 |
| Interpretation of the rules | p. 193 |
| Intransigence versus size: which is more helpful? | p. 195 |
| Negotiations on world trade | p. 199 |
| Intransigence in negotiations | p. 204 |
| Summary and conclusions | p. 207 |
| Appendix | p. 215 |
| Glossary | p. 220 |
| Bibliography | p. 229 |
| Index | p. 241 |
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