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The Sanctions Paradox : Economic Statecraft and International Relations - Daniel W. Drezner

The Sanctions Paradox

Economic Statecraft and International Relations

Hardcover Published: 25th January 2013
ISBN: 9780521643320
Number Of Pages: 364

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Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what determines their success. This book argues that both imposers and targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behaviour. Drezner argues that conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect. Adversaries will impose sanctions frequently, but rarely secure concessions. Allies will be reluctant to use coercion, but once sanctions are used, they can result in significant concessions. Ironically, the most favourable distribution of payoffs is likely to result when the imposer cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. The book's argument is pursued using game theory and statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Russia's relations with newly-independent states, and US efforts to halt nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula.

Industry Reviews

'The Sanctions Paradox is one of the best books written in the field of international political economy during the 1990s. It offers a simple but clever theory that explains when states are likely to employ economic sanctions and when they are likely to work. Since sanctions seem destined to remain a favourite tool of statecraft in the 21st century, this book is likely to be paid serious attention for years to come.' John Mearsheimer, University of Chicago

List of figuresp. xii
List of tablesp. xiii
Acknowledgmentsp. xv
Introductionp. 1
A tale of two casesp. 1
The argumentp. 4
Why economic coercion mattersp. 6
The literaturep. 9
Flaws in the literaturep. 18
The methodologyp. 21
The rest of the bookp. 22
Theory and datap. 25
A model of economic coercionp. 27
The assumptionsp. 28
The modelp. 35
A caveat: switches in preferencesp. 47
Another caveat: non-negotiable demandsp. 48
Choosing between carrots and sticksp. 50
Conclusions and implicationsp. 53
Proofs of lemmasp. 55
Plausibility probesp. 59
First impressionsp. 60
Statistical studies of sanctions initiationp. 62
Statistical studies of sanctions outcomesp. 68
The grain embargop. 74
The pipeline sanctionsp. 80
Economic sanctions and human rightsp. 88
Summaryp. 99
Statistical testsp. 102
Selecting the appropriate samplep. 102
Operationalizing the variablesp. 106
Testing the causes of sanctions initiationp. 114
Testing the causes of sanctions outcomesp. 121
Summaryp. 127
Economic coercion in the former Soviet Unionp. 129
Russian power and preferencesp. 131
The motivationp. 131
Russian policy preferencesp. 134
Russia's ability to coercep. 140
Conflict expectations with Russiap. 147
Predicting the outcomesp. 150
The extent of NIS concessionsp. 153
Introductionp. 153
Belarusp. 154
Kazakhstanp. 160
Turkmenistanp. 169
Kyrgyzstanp. 173
Armeniap. 176
Tajikistanp. 179
Uzbekistanp. 183
Moldovap. 187
Georgiap. 193
Ukrainep. 198
Azerbaijanp. 208
Lithuaniap. 215
Latviap. 219
Estoniap. 224
Conclusionp. 229
Evaluating the evidencep. 231
Introductionp. 231
Coding the datap. 232
Predictions and outcomesp. 233
A Boolean analysisp. 239
Some final observationsp. 245
Choosing between carrots and sticksp. 249
Economic statecraft and nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsulap. 251
Carrots and sticksp. 251
The United States and South Korea's nuclear programp. 254
The United States and North Korea's nuclear programp. 275
Implicationsp. 303
Conclusionp. 305
Conclusions, implications, speculationsp. 307
A reviewp. 307
Additional insightsp. 309
A critiquep. 311
Policy implicationsp. 312
Questions for future researchp. 317
Referencesp. 322
Indexp. 336
Table of Contents provided by Syndetics. All Rights Reserved.

ISBN: 9780521643320
ISBN-10: 0521643325
Series: Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Hardcover)
Audience: Professional
Format: Hardcover
Language: English
Number Of Pages: 364
Published: 25th January 2013
Country of Publication: GB
Dimensions (cm): 22.86 x 15.24  x 2.06
Weight (kg): 0.65