In the past decade, power controlling the nation's taxing and spending policies has become increasingly concentrated in the hands of the affluent--and exercised for the benefit of the affluent. Traditional liberal beliefs in tax equity and income redistribution have been replaced by theories justifying tax reductions in income concentrated among the very rich. In this book, Thomas Edsall, a Capitol Hill reporter for the Washington Post, examines the new power centers in the Democratic and Republican parties, the corporate lobbying community, and organized labor, and explores the changes in United States politics that have led to the shift in economic policy under Reagan administration.
Industry Reviews
Washington Post reporter Edsall is amazed at the turn in public policy away from concern with economic redistribution and social welfare - and convinced that the change is deeper than the advent of the Reagan administration, a point he skillfully drives home. The key to the shift in policy really lies with the Democratic party. Using academic studies (without pretentiousness), Edsall shows that the Democrats were in trouble in the late '60s and early '70s. Previous Democratic success had rested on coalition politicking: making different promises to different constituencies - labor, immigrants, the poor - and then smoothing over the differences through compromise when in office. Democratic hegemony depended on this capability and on a growing electoral base, bringing in more votes from the bottom. But things started to change. Television campaigning worked against the discrete promises essential to keeping a coalition together. Voter turnouts started to decline, and the Democratic constituency became increasingly skewed toward better-educated, higher-income citizens. Party rules instituting open primaries played a part too, since primary voters are even less representative of Democratic voters as a whole. Before events reached a crisis, Watergate artificially revived the Democrats - except that the revival took the form of Democrats being elected in formerly Republican constituencies. These "new" Democrats had and have no interest in expanding the electorate, and take their role as representatives of higher income groups seriously. This was one reason the Democrats went along with Reagan economic policies. (There were other factors: reform in congressional seniority shifted power away from older, often liberal Democrats to younger, ideologically mixed ones; the latter show a preference for procedural over substantive reforms; and individual candidates are more dependent upon corporate money for their campaigns, most of which goes to incumbents, than on party resources.) These changes in the Democratic party - combined with the Republicans' ideological cohesion and wealth, a political offensive by business, and a decline in labor-union power - here set the stage for the new inequality. Edsall points out that Democratic gains in the 1982 elections were tied to an increased turnout fueled by animosity toward the Reagan administration, but that the Democrats as a party didn't foment it and don't know what to do with it. Nothing in this analysis is glitteringly new, but it is an economical and accessible synthesis especially valuable in this election year. (Kirkus Reviews)
