| Foreword | p. xi |
| Acknowledgments | p. xv |
| Prologue | p. xvii |
| The Contextual Background | |
| Facts Regarding Iraqi Oil and Gas Reserves and Their Legal Status Prior to Self-Governance | p. 3 |
| Introduction | p. 3 |
| Iraqi Oil and Gas Production | p. 9 |
| Main Iraqi Pipelines | p. 12 |
| Iraqi Refineries | p. 17 |
| Legal Status of Iraqi Oil and Gas Reserves Prior to Self-Governance | p. 19 |
| Conclusion | p. 26 |
| The Provisions of the Iraqi Constitution Addressing Oil and Gas Activities: Of the Role of Subcentral Governing Entities, Handling of Revenues, and ôPresentö versus ôFutureö Fields | p. 27 |
| Introduction | p. 27 |
| Structure of the Iraqi Constitution | p. 31 |
| Revenue Sharing: Articles 112 and 121 | p. 38 |
| Authority of Subcentral Units to Enter Oil and Gas Development Agreements:An Assessment of the Constitutionality of Efforts by theKRG | p. 41 |
| Constitutional Authority of Subcentral Units and the Matter ofôPresentö versus ôFutureö Fields | p. 46 |
| Conclusion | p. 52 |
| The Complications Associated With Iraqi Legislative Measures | |
| Federal Oil and Gas Framework Law and Subcentral Government Responses | p. 59 |
| Introduction | p. 59 |
| Basics of the Federal Oil and Gas Framework Law | p. 60 |
| Significant Legal Issues | p. 74 |
| The KRG's Oil and Gas Law No. (22) of 2007 | p. 79 |
| Problems Associated with Preexisting Oil and Gas Contracts | p. 90 |
| Conclusion | p. 95 |
| A Primer on the Federal Model Exploration and Production Contracts and the Kurdistan Regional Government's Model Production-Sharing Contract | p. 97 |
| Introduction | p. 97 |
| Federal Government Model Exploration and Production Contracts | p. 99 |
| The KRG's Model Form of PSC: The Principal Provisions Subgroup | p. 113 |
| Substance and Nature of the PSC | p. 114 |
| The Host Government's Right of Participation | p. 118 |
| Work Duties Imposed on the Contract Holder | p. 119 |
| Financial Obligations Associated with the Contract | p. 122 |
| The KRG's Model Form of PSC: The Adjectival ProvisionsSubgroup | p. 126 |
| The Making of Decisions | p. 126 |
| Handling of Land and Assets | p. 127 |
| The Matter of Contract Stabilization | p. 130 |
| Important Miscellaneous Adjectival Provisions | p. 131 |
| Conclusion | p. 168 |
| The Federal Oil and Gas Revenue-Sharing Law: Its Many Problems | p. 138 |
| Introduction | p. 138 |
| Context of Iraqi Revenue-Sharing Law | p. 141 |
| Overview of the Revenue-Sharing Law | p. 144 |
| Difficulties Associated with the Collection of Revenues | p. 148 |
| Difficulties Associated with Distribution of Oil and Gas Revenues | p. 159 |
| Conclusion | p. 168 |
| Measures to Reconstitute the Iraq National Oil (INOC) and Reorganize the Ministry of Oil | p. 171 |
| Introduction | p. 171 |
| The Relevant Terms of the Iraqi Constitution | p. 172 |
| The Federal Oil and Gas Framework Approach: Articles 6 and 7, as Well as 5D and 5E | p. 176 |
| Articles 6 and 7 | p. 177 |
| Articles 5D and 5E | p. 181 |
| Federal Oil and Gas Framework Approach: Scattered Articles | p. 186 |
| Relevant Insights on the Restructuring of INOC and the Ministry ofOil from the KRG's 2007 Oil and Gas Law | p. 192 |
| Basic Conditions and Current Thinking Associated with Reconstituting INOC and Reorganizing the Ministry of Oil | p. 197 |
| Conclusion | p. 207 |
| Current Issues and Potential Future Problems | |
| The Matter of Creditor Claims: An Examination of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1790 (18 Dec. 2007) and 1859 (22 Dec. 2008), and Their Predecessors | p. 211 |
| Introduction | p. 211 |
| Primer on the Predecessors of Resolutions 1790 and 1859 | p. 213 |
| Security Council Resolutions 1790 (18 Dec. 2007) and 1859 (22 Dec. 2008) | p. 221 |
| Analytical Significance of Protection from Legal Claims | p. 232 |
| Conclusion | p. 241 |
| Central Government Authority to Strike Oil and Gas Development Agreements in the Absence of a Federal Framework Law | p. 244 |
| Introduction | p. 244 |
| The Constitutional Context | p. 249 |
| Evaluating the Article 110 Arguments | p. 251 |
| Article 114's Shared Powers Arguments | p. 256 |
| Article 112: Direct Reference to Oil and Gas | p. 258 |
| Power Carried Over from Saddam-Era Measures | p. 262 |
| Conclusion | p. 269 |
| Distributing Profits in the Absence of a Federal Revenue-Sharing Law | p. 271 |
| Introduction | p. 271 |
| The Solidarity and Diversity Provisions: Articles 1, 3, and 14 of the Constitution | p. 273 |
| Economic and Social Security Provisions: Articles 27, 30, and 34 of the Constitution | p. 275 |
| Oil, Gas, and Natural Resources Provisions: Articles 111,112, and 121 of the Constitution | p. 278 |
| A Constitutional Sharing Obligation for Revenues Collected at the Subcentral Level? | p. 282 |
| Inadequacies of the Relevant Constitutional Provisions | p. 285 |
| Proposed Constitutional Amendments: How They Would Affect Revenue Distribution | p. 288 |
| Other Sources of Law Suggestive of an Obligation to Distribute Revenues | p. 290 |
| Conclusion | p. 293 |
| Changing the Mix: Transition Fails and the Face of Iraq Is Altered | p. 294 |
| Introduction | p. 294 |
| KRG and Central Government Apply Their Own Approaches | p. 298 |
| Kurdistan Regional Government | p. 299 |
| Central Government | p. 303 |
| The Country Splits Apart | p. 305 |
| Kurdistan as a Separate Nation-State | p. 306 |
| Separate State(s) in the Balance of Iraq | p. 311 |
| Conclusion | p. 317 |
| Epilogue | p. 321 |
| Index | p. 327 |
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