This book provides a radical alternative to naturalistic theories of content, and offers a new conception of the place of mind in the world. Confronting head-on the scientific conception of the nature of reality that has dominated the Anglo-American philosophical tradition, Michael Morris here presents a detailed analysis of content and propositional attitudes, based on the idea that truth is a value. In the course of this analysis, he rejects the causal theory of
the explanation of behaviour and replaces it with an alternative which depends upon a rich conception of the behaviour we explain with reference to states of mind. According to the theory presented
here, our understanding of other people is inextricably involved with our evaluation of what they do, and the objectivity of truth depends on the objectivity of moral goodness. Dr Morris's lucid and detailed exposition of his controversial argument sounds an emphatic challenge to the naturalistic orthodoxy in areas as diverse as metaphysics, ethics, and cognitive science.
`Morris's bold venture merits careful attention ... This book is like a breath of fresh air in the face of sterile and reductive neo-functional accounts of content. It captures the insight that human psychology is adapted to tracking human and social responses to the world rather than forging some individualistic extension-response based path through it ... I find Morris's views and arguments deeply congenial. His book is, I believe, essential reading for
those wanting seriously to engage with current controversies in the philosophy of mind and content and to examine their impact on our epistemology.'
Series: Oxford Philosophical Monographs
Number Of Pages: 350
Published: 5th November 1992
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Country of Publication: GB
Dimensions (cm): 22.4 x 14.5
Weight (kg): 0.58