This book describes in much detail both how and why franchising works. It also analyses the economic tensions that contribute to conflict in the franchisor-franchisee relationship. The treatment includes a great deal of empirical evidence on franchising, its importance in various segments of the economy, the terms of franchise contracts, and what we know about how all these have evolved over time, especially in the US market. A good many myths are dispelled in the process. The economic analysis of the franchisor-franchisee relationship begins with the observation that for franchisors, franchising is a contractual alternative to vertical integration. Subsequently, the tensions that arise between a franchisor and its franchisees, who in fact are owners of independent businesses, are examined in turn. In particular the authors discuss issues related to product quality control, tying arrangements, pricing, location and territories, advertising, and termination and renewals.
'In The Economics of Franchising, Blair and Lafontaine have provided an exceptionally comprehensive and cogent treatment of franchise law and economics. They have made complex economic analysis accessible and at the same time have revealed the hidden complexity behind some of the naive misconceptions associated with franchising. But what I liked best was their ability to treat each topic with a blend of managerially relevant discussion and formal analysis. It is a book that will appeal to anyone with a business, legal or research interest in franchising.' Patrick Kaufmann, Boston University 'A book on franchising by the experts in this field is a welcome addition. It will be extremely valuable for both teachers and researchers.' Jeffrey M. Perloff, University of California, Berkeley