| Introduction | p. 1 |
| General Issues in Bankruptcy Law | p. 5 |
| Coordination Problems | p. 5 |
| Ex-Ante Efficiency: Incentives in Bankruptcy Law | p. 8 |
| Bankruptcy Procedures and Their Ex-Post Efficiency | p. 10 |
| Corporate Bankruptcy Law: Key Features and Implementation | p. 16 |
| References | p. 17 |
| Are Banks Special? Implications for Bank Bankruptcy Law | p. 21 |
| What Is Different About Banks? | p. 21 |
| Liquidity Provision and Bank Runs | p. 22 |
| Systemic Impact and Regulatory Failure | p. 23 |
| Ex-Ante Moral Hazard: Risk Shifting | p. 26 |
| Ex-Post Moral Hazard: Opaqueness and Asset Substitution | p. 29 |
| Multiple Regulators and Political Economy of Banking | p. 30 |
| Bank Bankruptcy Law | p. 34 |
| Timely Intervention | p. 34 |
| Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Optimality | p. 39 |
| Liquidation, Purchase and Assumption Agreement, and Nationaliziation | p. 42 |
| The Design of Bank Bankruptcy Law and Its Relations to Corporate Bankruptcy Law | p. 49 |
| References | p. 57 |
| Systemic Crises | p. 65 |
| Theoretical Research on Systemic Crises | p. 65 |
| Empirical Research on systemic Crises | p. 71 |
| Accommodative Approach Towards Resolving Systemic Crises | p. 71 |
| Institutional Environment and the Costs of Systemic Crises | p. 74 |
| The Interaction Between Banking Crises, Currency Crises, and Sovereign Defaults | p. 76 |
| Overviews of Interventions During the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis | p. 77 |
| References | p. 82 |
| General Issues on the Structure of Banking Industry | p. 85 |
| Strengthening the Ex-Ante Regulatory Framework: Prudential Regulation | p. 85 |
| Separation of Public Infrastructure from the Financial System | p. 88 |
| Netting: The Case of Bank Loans | p. 91 |
| Closeout Netting: The Case of Derivative Contracts | p. 92 |
| References | p. 94 |
| Current Bank Bankruptcy Regimes and Recent Developments | p. 97 |
| General Overview of Bank Bankruptcy Frameworks Around the World | p. 97 |
| Early Proposals on the Bank Insolvency Legal Framework: The Case of Sweden | p. 101 |
| The European Union Bank Bankruptcy and Reorganization Regime | p. 103 |
| The Bank Bankruptcy Regime in Germany | p. 109 |
| The U.S. Bank Bankruptcy Regime | p. 113 |
| The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act | p. 116 |
| Bank Bankruptcy Regime in the UK | p. 121 |
| Brief Comparison of U.S., UK, and German Bank Bankruptcy Law and Assessment | p. 124 |
| References | p. 129 |
| Optimal Design of Bank Bankruptcy Law and the Bank Failures from the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis | p. 133 |
| Optimal Design of Bank Bankruptcy Law | p. 133 |
| The Northern Rock Collapse | p. 139 |
| The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy | p. 141 |
| The Fortis Bank Bankruptcy | p. 143 |
| References | p. 145 |
| Conclusions | p. 147 |
| Appendix | p. 149 |
| Design of Bankruptcy Law: U.S. Corporate Bankruptcy Law | p. 149 |
| Liquidation Under Chapter 7 Versus Continuation Under Chapter 11 | p. 149 |
| The Evolution of Chapter 11: DIP Financing, Asset Sales, and Tax Claims | p. 151 |
| Coordination Problems in U.S. Corporate Bankruptcy Law | p. 153 |
| Proposed Reforms of U.S. Corporate Bankruptcy Law | p. 153 |
| Shift of Control | p. 154 |
| Asset Sales | p. 155 |
| Summary and Comparison Between U.S. Corporate and Bank Bankruptcy Laws | p. 157 |
| References | p. 157 |
| Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved. |
