Written by an international team of authors, this book provides the first systematic account of the control of corporate Europe based on voting block data disclosed in accordance with the European Union's Large Holdings Directive (88/627/EEC). The study provides detailed information on the voting control of companies listed on the official markets in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and, as a benchmark comparison, the United States. The authors record a high concentration of control of corporations in many European countries with single blockholders frequently controlling more than fifty per cent of corporate votes. In contrast, a majority of UK listed companies have no blockholder owning more than ten per cent of shares, and a majority of US listed companies have no blockholder with more than six per cent of shares. Those chapters devoted to individual countries illustrate how blockholders can use legal devices to leverage their voting power over their cash-flow rights, or how incumbents prevent outsiders from gaining voting control.
It is shown that the cultural and linguistic diversity of Europe is (almost) matched by its variety of corporate control arrangements.
`'The Control of Corporate Europe is the most in-depth study of the nuances and structure of concentrated ownership and voting control in Europe's large firms. An excellent result from first-rate researchers.'
Mark Roe, Berg Professor of Law, Harvard Law School
`'This rigorous analysis of corporate control in Europe is thought provoking and I have no doubts that it will become a standard reference on the subject. I recommend it to anybody wanting to understand the complex issues confronting the European Union as it strives to formulate its securities market regulation, in particular the rules on corporate takeovers.'
Theodor Baums, Professor of Corporate and Banking Law, University of Frankfurt and Chairman of the German Government's Commission on Corporate Governance
`'A significant contribution to the corporate governance literature. The ECGN and editors Fabrizio Barca and Marco Becht deserve broad praise for spearheading this extremely well-researched and detailed study of ownership and control patterns in European nations. The Control of Corporate Europe provides valuable insight into the nature and impact of ownership concentration and voting control of European companies, which is particularly important given the
burgeoning interest in shareholder activism in Europe. It will be a source of enormous value to the corporate governance community for many years to come.'
Ira M. Millstein, Senior Partner, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP and Chairman, World Bank/OECD Private Sector Advisory Group on Corporate Governance
1: M. Becht and C. Mayer: The Control of Corporate Europe
2: K. Gugler, S. Kalss, A. Stomper, and J. Zechner: The Separation of Ownership and Control in Austria
3: M. Becht, A. Chapelle, and L. Renneboog: Shareholding Cascades: The Separation of Ownership and Control in Belgium
4: L. Bloch and E. Kremp: Ownership and Voting Power in France
5: M. Becht and E. Boehmer: Ownership and Voting Power in Germany
6: M. Bianchi, M. Bianco, and L. Enriques: Pyramidal Groups and the Separation between Ownership and Control in Italy
7: A. de Jong, R. Kabir, T. Marra, and A. Roell: Ownership and Control in the Netherlands
8: R. Crespi and M. Garcia-Cestona: Ownership and Control of Spanish Listed Firms
9: J. Agnblad, E. Berglof, P. Hogfeldt, and H. Svancar: Ownership and Control in Sweden---Strong Owners, Weak Minorities, and Social Control
10: M. Goergen and L. Renneboog: Strong Managers and Passive Institutional Investors in the United Kingdom
11: M. Becht: Beneficial Ownership in the United States
Appendix IThe Large Holdings Directive
Appendix IIComparative Tables
Series: Feem Studies in Economics
Number Of Pages: 354
Published: 1st January 2002
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Country of Publication: GB
Dimensions (cm): 24.5 x 16.4
Weight (kg): 0.52