The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy 1945-1955

'Clark and Wheeler have produced a lucid and perceptive analysis and have done so in a scholarly and systematic manner.' Times Higher Education Supplement 'essential reading for specialists in military strategy and historians' Christopher Meredith, World Disarm 'interesting book ... the two authors have succeeded in presenting, in chronological sequence, a coherent reconstruction of the principal strands of British thought about nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy in this early period ... Their style is refreshingly free of jargon and their research is scholarly.' Robin Edmonds, Survival 'There are a number of fascinating historical insights here ... which will offer useful evidence both for those who would develop nuclear strategic thinking and those who would debunk it.' Michael Clarke, University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Political Studies `a fascinating book ... Most of the work is based on a careful and detailed study of the pertinent official documents which are preserved in the Public Record Office at Kew. Indeed, the authors provide a helpful and interesting `Note on the Official Records' at the end of their book, which is written solely for technical experts in their field.' The International History Review `the research is prodigious and based on recently opened documents at the Public Records Office. The result is an important addition to cold war historiography' American Historical Review 'This volume, as well as offering the first independent and detailed historical assessment of Britain's first decade of nuclear planning, forms part of a welcome expansion in British strategic history ... a major contribution to our understanding of the shifts in British strategic thinking during a decade when the foundations of Britain's nuclear force were laid.' Richard J. Aldrich, History 'This book constitutes a major contribution to our understanding of the shifts in British strategic thinking during a decade when the foundations of Britain's nuclear force were laid.' Richard J. Aldrich, History