Philosophy of language occupies a pivotal role in philosophy. It is at once an area of cutting-edge research in its own right; a set of concerns which overlap logic, metaphysics and linguistics; and a tool with applications to every core area in philosophy. The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Language is a collection of twenty new essays by internationally renowned scholars. Each contribution offers an authoritative survey of a central topic in philosophy of language, accompanied by an abstract and suggestions for further reading. Included are chapters on analyticity, anaphora, conditionals, descriptions, formal semantics, indexicals and demonstratives, kind terms, metaphor, names, propositional attitude ascriptions, speech acts, truth, and vagueness. The chapters also provide extended treatments of theories of meaning and reference, and an investigation of foundational issues. An introduction written by the editors completes the volume.Suitable for a textbook for upper-level undergraduate and graduate survey courses, the Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Language is also an invaluable resource for professional philosophers.
?Contains much of worth and will not doubt prove a useful addition to the burgeoning market for survey volumes in philosophy of language.? (Philosophy In Review)
?A superb collection of essays by a virtual who?s who of the philosophy of language today?the articles clearly and helpfully sum up the state of play without erasing their authors? distinctive perspectives.?
?Paul Boghossian, New York University
?Devitt and Hanley have assembled a superb list of contributors. They are all leading authorities on their topics, and together they offer an absolutely up-to-date analysis of current issues in the philosophy of language. This is the first book I would choose for a course on this subject.?
?David Papineau, King?s College London
Notes on Contributors.
Introduction: Michael Devitt and Richard Hanley.
Part I: Foundational Issues.
Foundations issues in the philosophy of language: Martin Davies (Australian National University).
Part II: Meaning.
The nature of meaning: Paul Horwich (City University of New York Graduate Center).
Truth and reference as the basis for meaning: James Higginbotham (University of Southern California).
Language, thought, and meaning: Brian Loar (Rutgers University).
Meaning skepticism: Alex Miller (Macquarie University).
Analyticity again: Jerry Fodor and Ernie Lepore (Rutgers University).
Formal semantics: Max Cresswell (University of Aukland & Texas A&M University) Speech acts and pragmatics: Kent Bach (San Francisco State University).
Figurative language: Josef Stern (University of Chicago & Bar-Ilan University, Israel).
Propositional attitude ascription: Mark Richard (Tufts University).
Conditionals: Frank Jackson (Australian National University).
Vagueness: Stephen Schiffer (New York University).
The semantics of non-factualism, non-cognitivism, quasi-realism: Simon Blackburn (University of Cambridge).
Part III: Reference.
Names: William Lycan (University of North Carolina).
General terms and mass terms: Stephen Schwartz (Ithaca College).
Descriptions: Peter Ludlow and Stephen Neale (University of Michigan & Rutgers University).
Using indexicals: John Perry (Stanford University).
Pronouns and anaphora: Stephen Neale (Rutgers University).
Naturalistic theories of reference: Karen Neander (University of California, Davis) Truth: Vann McGee (Massachusetts Institute of Technology).