Special Operations and Strategy

Historically, special forces have been prone to misuse or misapplication. In particular, how special operations achieve their strategic effects has not been well understood. This stems in part from the Western historical tradition of the independently decisive 'great raid'. This work examines how a number of different special operations, in conjunction with more conventional military actions, achieve and sustain strategic effect(s) over time. In particular, this thesis argues that the root of effective special operations lies in understanding the relationship that exists between moral and material attrition at the strategic level through an examination of strategic theory and case studies.
The key to understanding how special operations improve strategic performance resides in the concept of strategic attrition, and by extension, the nature of strategy. The nature of strategy reflects the complexities associated with moral and material interactions between competing adversaries. Theorists including Carl von Clausewitz, Hans Delbruck, and Mao Zedong, understood that attrition has a moral dimension at the strategic level in addition to its more commonly known material one. By focusing a number of special operations against enemy moral and material vulnerabilities over time, and in conjunction with conventional operations, an enemy's will to fight can be eroded more quickly and efficiently. However, the use of the Special Air Service Brigade during the Normandy campaign in 1944, in this case incorporating special operations into a campaign of attrition, may not succeed for reasons related to the nature of strategy even when the desired goals are clearly understood.