Requests as Reasons

Requests can sometimes create reasons for action, and sometimes obligations. Request norms explain their reason-giving force, as being able to create reasons for others is valuable for us.

In this book, Peter Schaber explores the normative force of requests. The epistemic view holds that by informing the requestees of what the requester desires, the requester may draw the requestee's attention to an already existing reason to comply with the request. In contrast, Schaber argues that requests themselves possess normative force if certain conditions are met. Requests create reasons for the requestee to honor if and only if the requested act is good or at least not sufficiently bad, and if it is good to take the request as a reason for action.

In some cases, requests do not merely create reasons but impose obligations. Requests can create obligations even though the requester does not intend to impose an obligation on the requestee, unlike in the case of an order, where the prescriber communicates the intention to impose an obligation on the addressee of the order. Whether a request creates reasons or obligations is determined by request norms, which can be framed as follows: âIf and because A asks B to do x, B has a reason to do xâ. The request might trigger an obligation, thus imposing an obligation on B to honor the request. Alternatively, the reason might not trigger an obligation, and thus B is not obliged to honor the request.

Request norms hold if and because it is valuable to follow. Certain requests are not reason-giving because it would not be valuable for us if they were, but the practice of making requests is essential for living respectfully with others.