This book ofers an analysis of an area central to many fields of current interest - cognitive science, developmental psychology, language studies, and the interactions between these and the philosophy of mind and psychology. The study examines the relationship between thought and language by considering the views of Kant and Wittgenstein alongside many strands of contemporary debate in the area of mental content. Building on an analysis of the nature of concepts and conceptions of objects, an account is generated of psychological explanation and of the subject of experience. A perspective on mental representation and linguistic meaning is offered, and the vexed topics of cognitive roles and singular thought are accommodated. The author concludes by outlining certain considerations relevant to sceptical arguments and the nature of perception. The synthesis that results from this project shows some correlations with contemporary work in cognitive and developmental psychology and is directly relevant to work in epistemology, philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology. Extensive consideration is given to the work of Evans, Peacock and McGinn, as well as to Kant and Wittgenstein.
This essay should be of interest to under- and postgraduate students in philosophy and cognitive psychology and to scholars in philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology.
'this is a book for those well down the road of linguistic theory, the struggle for truth claims and meaning in relation to mental states'
Carrie Pemberton, Trinity Hall, Cambridge, Theological Book Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, October 1994
1: Concepts and generality
2: The subject of experience
3: Mental explanation and the content of thought
4: Cognitive development and cognitive systems
6: Linguistic meaning
7: Cognitive siginificance
8: Singular thought
9: Mind dependence and reality