| Translator's | |
| Note | |
| Foreword | |
| Preface | |
| Introduction | |
| The Topic of Kuhn's Philosophy of Science | |
| The Issue: Scientific Development | |
| The Total Domain of Science | |
| Permissible Units of Analysis within the Domain of Science | |
| The Construction of the Target Issue: The Historiography of Science | |
| The Old Internal Historiography of Science | |
| The Critique of the Old Internal Historiography of Science | |
| The New Internal Historiography of Science | |
| The Focus: Structure Summary of Part I | |
| Scientific Knowledge and Its Object | |
| The World Concept | |
| The Double Meaning of "World" and "Nature" in SSRand the Plurality-of-Phenomenal-Worlds Thesis | |
| World-in-Itself and Phenomenal World in SSR | |
| The Plurality-of-Phenomenal-Worlds Thesis and Its Justification | |
| Stimulus and Sensation in the 1969 Papers | |
| The Transition from SSR | |
| The Ambiguity of the Stimulus Concept | |
| Contributions Credited to the Stimulus Ontology | |
| Troubles with the Stimulus Ontology | |
| The Modified Stimulus Ontology | |
| The Phenomenal World after 1969 | |
| The Constitution of a Phenomenal World | |
| The Learning Process | |
| Similarity Relations | |
| Ostension | |
| Social Community | |
| Perception | |
| Empirical Concepts | |
| Preliminary Remarks | |
| Concept Learning without Use of Laws or Theories in Kuhn's Work up to 1969 | |
| Concept Learning without Use of Laws or Theories in Kuhn's Work after 1969 | |
| The Relationship between Earlier and Later Conceptions of Concept Learning without Use of Laws or Theories | |
| Concept Learning with the Help of Laws and Theories | |
| The Impossibility of Explicitly Defining Empirical Concepts | |
| Consequences for the Theory of Meaning as Applied to Empirical Concepts | |
| Knowledge of Nature | |
| The Content of Such Knowledge | |
| The Characteristics of Such Knowledge | |
| The Nonneutrality of the Analyst's Viewpoint | |
| The Paradigm Concept | |
| Reasons for Introducting the Original Paradigm Concept | |
| The Development of the Paradigm Concept | |
| From "Paradigm" to "Disciplinary Matrix" | |
| The Retraction of the Property of Universal Acceptance | |
| The Disciplinary Matrix | |
| Symbolic Generalizations | |
| Models | |
| Values | |
| Exemplary Problem Solutions | |
| The Relationship between "Components" of the Disciplinary Matrix | |
| The Functions of Paradigms in the Sense of Exemplary Problem Solutions | |
| The Lexicon of Empirical Concepts | |
| The Identification of Research Problems | |
| The Acceptability of Solutions to Research Problems Summary of Part II | |
| The Dynamic of Scientific Knowledge | |
| Normal Science | |
| Normal Science: Provisional Characterization | |
| Analogies to Puzzle-solving | |
| The Existence of Regulations | |
| Expectations of Solubility | |
| No Intention of Fundamental Innovation | |
| Neither Test nor Confirmation | |
| Individual Motivation | |
| The Research Problems of Normal Science | |
| Progress in Normal Science | |
| What Makes Normal Science Possible? | |
| Training Preparatory for Practicing Normal Science | |
| The Emergence of Normal Science out of Prenormal Science | |
| The Functional Role of the Quasi-dogmatic Element of Normal Science | |
| The Concept of a Scientific Revolution | |
| Kuhn's Extension of the Concept of a Scientific Revolution | |
| Change of World | |
| Incommensurability | |
| The Introduction of the Incommensurability Concept in SSR | |
| Further Developments at the End of the 1960s and in the 1970s | |
| Further Development in the 1980s | |
| The First Misunderstanding: Incommensurability Implies Incomparability | |
| The Second Misunderstanding: Inco | |
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