| Introduction: Philosophical Skepticism and Pyrrhonism | p. 3 |
| Gettier and the Problem of Knowledge | |
| Gettier Problems | p. 15 |
| Gettier's Formulation | p. 15 |
| Gettier's Reasons for Accepting His First Point | p. 16 |
| Gettier's Understanding of Justification | p. 17 |
| A Second Interpretation of Justification | p. 18 |
| The Gettier Problems and Nonmonotonicity | p. 21 |
| Variations on the Gettier Problems | p. 23 |
| Epistemic Responsibility | p. 26 |
| Conclusion | p. 28 |
| Fourth-Clause Theories | p. 31 |
| Analyses of Knowledge | p. 31 |
| Indefeasibility Theories | p. 33 |
| Externalism | p. 41 |
| The Attraction of Externalism | p. 42 |
| BonJour against the Reliabilists | p. 43 |
| Externalist Grounds | p. 46 |
| Goldman and Causal Theories of Knowing | p. 49 |
| The Move to the Subjunctive | p. 54 |
| Subjunctivism and Subjunctivitis | p. 61 |
| Conclusive Reasons | p. 61 |
| Subjunctivism | p. 66 |
| Subjunctivitis | p. 70 |
| Subjunctive Conditionals and Possible Worlds | p. 72 |
| Nozick against the "Skeptics," | p. 75 |
| The Failure of Epistemic Closure | p. 79 |
| Nozick against the Skeptics | p. 81 |
| Dretske against Epistemic Closure | p. 82 |
| Epistemic Grace | p. 88 |
| Justificatory Procedures | p. 89 |
| Doubts | p. 90 |
| Levels of Scrutiny | p. 93 |
| Is There a Fact of the Matter in Knowing? | p. 95 |
| It's Hard to Say | p. 98 |
| Summary of Part I | p. 99 |
| The Lottery Paradox and the Preface Paradox | p. 102 |
| The Lottery Paradox | p. 102 |
| The Preface Paradox | p. 105 |
| The Conjunction Principle for Knowledge | p. 108 |
| Agrippa and the Problem of Justification | |
| Agrippa and the Problem of Epistemic Justification | p. 113 |
| The Problem | p. 114 |
| Success Conditions on Theories of Justification | p. 117 |
| Theories of Epistemic Justification | p. 119 |
| Foundationalism | p. 123 |
| Forms of Foundationalism | p. 123 |
| Chisholm's Version of Foundationalism | p. 124 |
| Levels of Justification | p. 125 |
| Certainty and the Self-Presenting | p. 129 |
| Presumptions | p. 132 |
| The Transfer of Justification | p. 134 |
| Material Epistemic Principles | p. 135 |
| Summary and Evaluation | p. 138 |
| Internal Coherentism | p. 146 |
| BonJour's Version of Coherentism | p. 147 |
| Standards of Coherence | p. 148 |
| Immediate Problems | p. 149 |
| The Doxastic Presumption | p. 152 |
| Standard Objections to Coherentism | p. 154 |
| Coherence and Observation | p. 155 |
| The Multiple-Choice Problem | p. 158 |
| Justification and Truth | p. 159 |
| An Assessment | p. 162 |
| Lehrer and the Isolation Objection | p. 162 |
| External Coherentism | p. 170 |
| Davidson's Version of Coherentism | p. 171 |
| The Nature of Coherence | p. 172 |
| Truth | p. 173 |
| The Skeptical Challenge | p. 174 |
| Sensation and Belief | p. 175 |
| Meaning and Justification | p. 176 |
| The Fundamental Argument | p. 176 |
| The Golden Triangle | p. 182 |
| Davidson's Externalist Semantics | p. 183 |
| The Problem of Error | p. 184 |
| The Cartesian Skeptic's Reply | p. 186 |
| The Pyrrhonian Skeptic's Reply | p. 188 |
| Pyrrhonism | p. 192 |
| Neo-Pyrrhonism | p. 192 |
| Again, Is There a Fact of the Matter in Knowing? | p. 193 |
| The Pyrrhonist's Use of Epistemic Terms | p. 195 |
| Is Skepticism Statable? | p. 196 |
| A Temporary Stopping Point | p. 202 |
| Two Wittgensteins | p. 205 |
| Turning Things Around | p. 206 |
| Holism | p. 208 |
| Publicity | p. 211 |
| Action | p. 215 |
| References | p. 223 |
| Index | p. 231 |
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