Since the early 1960s, scholarly thinking on the power of U.S. presidents has rested on these words: "Presidential power is the power to persuade." Power, in this formulation, is strictly about bargaining and convincing other political actors to do things the president cannot accomplish alone. "Power without Persuasion" argues otherwise. Focusing on presidents' ability to act unilaterally, William Howell provides the most theoretically substantial and far-reaching reevaluation of presidential power in many years. He argues that presidents regularly set public policies over vocal objections by Congress, interest groups, and the bureaucracy.
Throughout U.S. history, going back to the Louisiana Purchase and the Emancipation Proclamation, presidents have set landmark policies on their own. More recently, Roosevelt interned Japanese Americans during World War II, Kennedy established the Peace Corps, Johnson got affirmative action underway, Reagan greatly expanded the president's powers of regulatory review, and Clinton extended protections to millions of acres of public lands. Since September 11, Bush has created a new cabinet post and constructed a parallel judicial system to try suspected terrorists.
Howell not only presents numerous new empirical findings but goes well beyond the theoretical scope of previous studies. Drawing richly on game theory and the new institutionalism, he examines the political conditions under which presidents can change policy without congressional or judicial consent. Clearly written, "Power without Persuasion" asserts a compelling new formulation of presidential power, one whose implications will resound.
One of Choice's Outstanding Academic Titles for 2004 "This must read shows the civics text version of the US system turned upside down."--Choice
|List of Figures||p. ix|
|List of Tables||p. xi|
|Presidential Power in the Modern Era||p. 1|
|A Formal Representation of Unilateral Action||p. 24|
|Bridge Building||p. 55|
|Theory Testing||p. 76|
|Congressional Constraints on Presidential Power||p. 101|
|The Institutional Foundations of Judicial Deference||p. 136|
|Coding of Executive Orders||p. 189|
|Proofs of Propositions in the Unilateral Politics Model||p. 192|
|Identifying Congressional Challenges to Executive Orders||p. 196|
|Federal Court Challenges to Executive Orders||p. 198|
|Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.|
Audience: Tertiary; University or College
Number Of Pages: 264
Published: 28th July 2003
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Country of Publication: US
Dimensions (cm): 23.5 x 15.2 x 1.73
Weight (kg): 0.37