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Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions : Multiparty Democracy: Elections and Legislative Politics - Michael Laver

Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions

Multiparty Democracy: Elections and Legislative Politics

Paperback Published: 1st August 2006
ISBN: 9780521456586
Number Of Pages: 258

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This book adapts a formal model of elections and legislative politics to study party politics in Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Britain, and the United States. The approach uses the idea of valence, that is, the party leader's non-policy electoral popularity, and employs survey data to model these elections. The analysis explains why small parties in Israel and Italy keep to the electoral periphery. In the Netherlands, Britain, and the US, the electoral model is extended to include the behavior of activists. In the case of Britain, it is shown that there will be contests between activists for the two main parties over who controls policy. For the recent 2005 election, it is argued that the losses of the Labour party were due to Blair's falling valence. For the US, the model gives an account of the rotation of the locations of the two major parties over the last century.

"Multiparty Democracy contributes immensely to both the formal theoretical literature on party competition, and to the empirical literature on elections and party behavior. Schofield and Sened demonstrate that incorporating the influence of valence issues - namely, party leaders' non-policy-related reputations with respect to competence, integrity, and charisma - into the standard spatial model provides critical insights into election outcomes and party strategies. Furthermore, the authors do a marvelous job highlighting political elites' strategic incentives to appeal to party activists, who can provide the resources used to carry the party message to the electorate. This blend of state-of-the-art formal theory and richly detailed empirical analyses of party politics in Israel, Italy, Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States, makes Multiparty Democracy as an instant classic." James Adams, University of California, Davis "Schofield and Sened investigate a problem at the heart of both the theory and the practice of representative government. This is the relationship between the preferences of citizens - including preferences that may have nothing to do with policy - and the outcomes of political competition. The authors investigate this problem in a way that is all too rare in political science, combining rigorous and creative theory with innovative and extensive data analysis, applied to particular important cases. The result will please both those whose main interests lie in theoretical models of political competition, and those whose main interests lie in the politics of real party competition." Michael Laver, New York University "Multiparty Democracy is an ambitious project. Norman Schofield and Itai Sened have successfully tackled a long-standing problem in positive political theory -- that of linking together pre-electoral maneuvering, elections, coalition building, and governance in a single comprehensive framework. In doing so they have offered many innovations. Perhaps the most significant is a new emphasis on voter assessments, not only of candidate and party policy inclinations (as is fairly standard in the literature), but also of partisan fitness to govern. This is a major accomplishment and is likely to set the agenda for future research for years to come." Kenneth A. Shepsle, Harvard University

List of Tables and Figuresp. xiii
Prefacep. xix
Multiparty Democracyp. 1
Introductionp. 1
The Structure of the Bookp. 8
Acknowledgmentsp. 10
Elections and Democracyp. 11
Electoral Competitionp. 11
Two-Party Competition under Plurality Rulep. 13
Multiparty Representative Democracyp. 15
The Legislative Stagep. 17
Two-Party Competition with Weakly Disciplined Partiesp. 18
Party Competition under Plurality Rulep. 18
Party Competition under Proportional Representationp. 19
Coalition Bargainingp. 19
The Electionp. 20
Expected Vote Maximizationp. 21
Exogenous Valencep. 21
Activist Valencep. 22
Activist Influence on Policyp. 23
Selection of the Party Leaderp. 23
Example: Israelp. 25
Electoral Models with Valencep. 32
The General Model of Multiparty Politicsp. 34
Policy Preferences of Party Principalsp. 34
Coalition and Electoral Riskp. 34
A Theory of Political Competitionp. 37
Local Equilibria in the Stochastic Modelp. 40
Local Equilibria under Electoral Uncertaintyp. 50
The Core and the Heartp. 55
Example: The Netherlandsp. 61
Example: Israelp. 64
Appendix: Proof of Theorem 3.1p. 67
Elections in Israel, 1988-1996p. 70
An Empirical Vote Modelp. 74
Comparing the Formal and Empirical Modelsp. 88
Coalition Bargainingp. 92
Conclusion: Elections and Legislative Bargainingp. 95
Appendixp. 97
Elections in Italy, 1992-1996p. 101
Introductionp. 101
Italian Politics Before 1992p. 102
The New Institutional Dimension: 1991-1996p. 105
The 1994 Electionp. 110
The Pre-Election Stagep. 110
The Electoral Stagep. 112
The Coalition Bargaining Gamep. 113
The 1996 Electionp. 116
The Pre-Election Stagep. 117
The Electoral Stagep. 120
The Coalition Bargaining Gamep. 123
Conclusionp. 124
Appendixp. 126
Elections in the Netherlands, 1979-1981p. 128
The Spatial Model with Activistsp. 128
Models of Elections with Activists in the Netherlandsp. 131
Technical Appendix: Computation of Eigenvaluesp. 142
Empirical Appendixp. 145
Elections in Britain, 1979-2005p. 151
The Elections of 1979, 1992, and 1997p. 152
Estimating the Influence of Activistsp. 159
A Formal Model of Vote-Maximizing with Activistsp. 163
Activist and Exogenous Valencep. 168
Conclusionp. 170
Technical Appendixp. 172
Computation of Eigenvaluesp. 172
Proof of Theorem 7.1p. 173
Political Realignments in the United Statesp. 175
Critical Elections in 1860 and 1964p. 175
A Brief Political History, 1860-2000p. 180
Models of Voting and Candidate Strategyp. 185
A Joint Model of Activists and Votersp. 189
The Logic of Vote Maximizationp. 193
Dynamic Local Equilibriap. 195
Appendicesp. 197
Concluding Remarksp. 199
Assessment of the Modelp. 199
Proportional Representationp. 200
The Election of September 2005 in Germanyp. 201
Recent Changes in the Israel Knessetp. 202
Plurality Rulep. 206
Theory and Empirical Evidencep. 207
Referencesp. 209
Indexp. 219
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.

ISBN: 9780521456586
ISBN-10: 0521456584
Series: Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
Audience: Professional
Format: Paperback
Language: English
Number Of Pages: 258
Published: 1st August 2006
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Country of Publication: GB
Dimensions (cm): 22.5 x 15.2  x 1.3
Weight (kg): 0.34