This series is dedicated to the timely publication of new work in this highly fertile field of philosophy. The subject is broadly construed, taken to include not only perennially central topics (modality, ontology, and mereology; metaphysical theories of causation, laws of nature, persistence through time, and time itself; and realism and anti-realism in the many senses of these terms); but also the rich clusters of metaphysical questions that open up within other subfields, such as philosophy of mind and philosophy of science (questions about supervenience and materialism, the nature of qualia, mental causation, metaphysical implications of relativity and quantum physics, mereological theories of biological species, and so on). Besides independent essays, volumes are likely to contain a critical essay on a recent book, or a symposium that allows participants to respond to one another's criticisms and questions. Each volume will also include an essay by the winner of the Oxford Studies in Metaphysics younger scholar award, a prize inaugurated with this first issue.
1: David Lewis: Tensed Qualifiers
2: Ned Markosian: A Defense of Presentism
3: Symposium: Defining Presentism
Thomas M. Crisp: On Presentism and Triviality
Peter Ludlow: Presentism, Triviality, and the Varieties of Tensism
Thomas M. Crisp: Reply to Ludlow
4: Simon Keller: Presentism and Truthmaking
5: Peter van Inwagen: A Theory of Properties
6: D. M. Armstrong: How Do Particulars Stand to Universals?
7: Cian Dorr: Non-symmetric Relations
III. Freedom, Causal Powers, and Causation
8: Peter Unger: The Mental Problems of the Many
9: John Heil: Properties and Powers
10: Ned Hall: The Intrinsic Character of Causation
11: Ryan Wasserman, John Hawthorne, and Mark Scala: Recombination, Causal Constraints, and Humean Supervenience: An Argument for Temporal Parts?
Series: Oxford Studies in Metaphysics : Book 1
Number Of Pages: 348
Published: 1st February 2004
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Country of Publication: GB
Dimensions (cm): 22.4 x 14.5
Weight (kg): 0.58