What is knowledge? Why do we want it? Is knowledge possible? How do we get it? What about other epistemic values like understanding and certainty? Why are so many epistemologists worried about luck? In ON EPISTEMOLOGY Linda Zagzebski situates epistemological questions within the broader framework of what we care about and why we care about it. Questions of value shape all of the above questions and explain some significant philosophical trends: the obsession with answering the skeptic, the flight from realism, and the debate between naturalism and anti-naturalism. THE WADSWORTH PHILOSOPHICAL TOPICS SERIES (under the general editorship of Robert Talisse, Vanderbilt University) presents readers with concise, timely, and insightful introductions to a variety of traditional and contemporary philosophical subjects. With this series, students of philosophy will be able to discover the richness of philosophical inquiry across a wide array of concepts, including hallmark philosophical themes and themes typically underrepresented in mainstream philosophy publishing. Written by a distinguished list of scholars who have garnered particular recognition for their excellence in teaching, this series presents the vast sweep of today's philosophical exploration in highly accessible and affordable volumes. These books will prove valuable to philosophy teachers and their students as well as to other readers who share a general interest in philosophy.
C. Virtues of epistemic communities. III. Irresolvable epistemic disagreement. IV. Summary. Chapter 5: What is Knowledge? I. Introduction. II. The value problem. III. Gettier. IV. Credit theories of knowledge. Chapter 6: Epistemic Good and the Good Life. I. The desirability of truth. II. Understanding. III. The intellect and the highest good.
Chapter 1: Epistemic Value and What we Care about.
II. Epistemic demands and what we care about.
III. Morality and epistemic demands.
V. Skepticism and what we care about.
Chapter 2: Skepticism and Some Contemporary Responses.
II. The first stage of the skeptical attack: the infinite regress of reasons.
A. Pyrrhonism and the regress.
B. Responses to the regress: foundationalism vs. coherentism.
III. The second stage of the skeptical attack: Descartes Evil Genius and the irrelevance of evidence.
A. The Evil Genius.
B. Denial of epistemic closure.
Chapter 3: Mind and World: Metaphysical and Semantic Responses to Skepticism.
I. The third stage of the skeptical attack: the Absolute Conception of Reality.
II. O.K. Bouwsma and the Evil Genius.
III. Putnam and the Brain-in-a-Vat.
IV. Skepticism, self-trust, and conscientious belief.
Chapter 4: Trust and the Intellectual Virtues.
I. Epistemic self-trust and the virtues that regulate it.
A. Conscientious self-trust.
B. Trust in admiration.
II. Epistemic trust in others and the virtues of epistemic communities.
A. Epistemic egoism as an ideal.
B. The incoherence of epistemic egoism.
C. Virtues of epistemic communities.
III. Irresolvable epistemic disagreement.
Chapter 5: What is Knowledge?
II. The value problem.
IV. Credit theories of knowledge.
Chapter 6: Epistemic Good and the Good Life.
I. The desirability of truth.
III. The intellect and the highest good.
Series: Philosopher (Wadsworth)
Tertiary; University or College
Number Of Pages: 192
Published: 11th July 2008
Publisher: Cengage Learning, Inc
Country of Publication: US
Dimensions (cm): 21.6 x 14.3
Weight (kg): 0.21
Edition Number: 1
Edition Type: New edition