| Introduction | p. 1 |
| The neutrality of money | p. 7 |
| Notes | p. 24 |
| |
| Monetary theory in the nineteen-sixties | p. 28 |
| Notes | p. 55 |
| Informational efficiency and economic efficiency | p. 59 |
| Rational expectations hypothesis | p. 59 |
| Efficiency | p. 66 |
| Noise and the Lucas model | p. 68 |
| Notes | p. 74 |
| |
| Rational expectations equilibrium (REE) | p. 75 |
| Efficiency | p. 80 |
| A characterization of REE | p. 87 |
| Notes | p. 92 |
| Expectations and economic policy | p. 93 |
| Expectations and the theory of economic policy | p. 94 |
| The importance of commitments: an example | p. 105 |
| Rules, commitments and rational expectations | p. 109 |
| Notes | p. 114 |
| |
| The repeated leader-follower game | p. 117 |
| Rules and the existence of REE | p. 127 |
| Notes | p. 135 |
| The economic costs of inflation | p. 136 |
| Traditional theory | p. 136 |
| Other explanations | p. 145 |
| Inflation and the rate of interest | p. 153 |
| Inflation and the supply of loanable funds | p. 159 |
| Notes | p. 162 |
| p. 163 |
| Notes | p. 180 |
| Sequences of budget constraints | p. 182 |
| The general equilibrium view of money | p. 182 |
| Borrowing and lending | p. 184 |
| Cash constraints and incomplete markets | p. 189 |
| Digression on flexibility | p. 192 |
| Transaction costs revisited | p. 194 |
| Notes | p. 197 |
| |
| The classical theorems of welfare economics | p. 198 |
| Economies with incomplete markets | p. 203 |
| Concepts of equilibrium in a sequence of markets | p. 207 |
| Efficiency properties of sequence equilibria | p. 213 |
| Efficiency properties of the futures equilibrium | p. 220 |
| Introducing money | p. 225 |
| Notes | p. 230 |
| Monetary equilibrium: a cooperative approach | p. 231 |
| The classical theory | p. 232 |
| The problem of trust | p. 234 |
| Introducing money | p. 239 |
| The sequential core with an incomplete set of assets | p. 246 |
| Notes | p. 248 |
| |
| Large economies | p. 250 |
| Some classical equivalence theorems | p. 252 |
| Monetary economies | p. 253 |
| The sequential core | p. 260 |
| Concepts of equilibrium in a sequence of markets | p. 264 |
| Characterization of strongly improving conditions | p. 269 |
| Formal results | p. 273 |
| Proofs | p. 280 |
| Discussion of results | p. 285 |
| Notes | p. 289 |
| Monetary equilibrium: a non-cooperative approach | p. 290 |
| A non-cooperative approach | p. 292 |
| Abstract market games | p. 295 |
| The Walrasian case | p. 299 |
| Sequential market games | p. 302 |
| Proof of Theorem 7.4.4 | p. 312 |
| The value of money | p. 318 |
| Efficient market games | p. 323 |
| Money, information and efficiency | p. 325 |
| Mathematical appendix | p. 330 |
| Bibliographical notes | p. 335 |
| References | p. 341 |
| Index | p. 347 |
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