| Preface | p. ix |
| The Federal Reserve and the Politics of Monetary Policy: Introduction and Overview | p. 1 |
| What is at stake? | p. 3 |
| Relationships with external actors | p. 10 |
| A framework for examining issues and relationships in monetary politics | p. 15 |
| The political position of the Federal Reserve | p. 22 |
| Conclusion and overview | p. 27 |
| A Capsule History of the Federal Reserve System | p. 30 |
| Defining the role of government in financial matters | p. 31 |
| The Federal Reserve: proximate sources | p. 35 |
| The conception of the role of the Federal Reserve | p. 39 |
| Resolving the question of the location of power over monetary policy | p. 41 |
| Conclusion | p. 46 |
| Recruitment and Selection of Federal Reserve Personnel | p. 48 |
| Recruitment processes | p. 49 |
| Occupational backgrounds of successful candidates | p. 55 |
| Background and behavior | p. 61 |
| Movement out of the System | p. 64 |
| Conclusion | p. 67 |
| Bankers and the Federal Reserve | p. 69 |
| The question of capture | p. 69 |
| Bankers' interests | p. 71 |
| Bankers' political resources | p. 74 |
| What have the bankers received? | p. 80 |
| Conclusion | p. 85 |
| Economists and the Federal Reserve | p. 88 |
| Non-issues | p. 88 |
| Monetarists and the issues in monetary politics | p. 90 |
| Mainstream economists and control of the Federal Reserve | p. 96 |
| The monetarist counterthrust | p. 99 |
| Economists' conflicts and Federal Reserve behavior | p. 101 |
| Conclusion | p. 105 |
| The President and the Federal Reserve | p. 108 |
| Presidential relations with the Federal Reserve | p. 109 |
| Conflicts | p. 119 |
| Elections | p. 125 |
| Conclusion | p. 129 |
| Congress and the Federal Reserve | p. 131 |
| Congress: capabilities and incentives | p. 132 |
| The banking committees | p. 133 |
| Patterns of interaction with the Federal Reserve | p. 138 |
| The congressional challenge of 1975 | p. 144 |
| Conclusion | p. 152 |
| Making Monetary Policy in a Political Environment: The Election of 1972 | p. 154 |
| The plausibility of the charge of election-year misbehavior | p. 155 |
| Discordant notes: Burns versus the White House, 1970-1971 | p. 157 |
| The alternative view: the pressure of controls | p. 158 |
| Inside the FOMC in 1972 | p. 161 |
| 1972 in retrospect | p. 168 |
| Conclusion | p. 179 |
| Monetary Politics: A Summary | p. 181 |
| Political economy approaches | p. 185 |
| Patterns of mobilization and monetary politics | p. 190 |
| A Note on Data Sources | p. 195 |
| Legislation Included in Table 7.1 | p. 203 |
| Academic Backgrounds and Career Experiences of Notable Monetarists | p. 208 |
| Notes | p. 211 |
| Bibliographic Note | p. 271 |
| Index | p. 275 |
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