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Models of Strategic Rationality : THEORY AND DECISION LIBRARY SERIES C, GAME THEORY, MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING, AND OPERATIONS RESEARCH - Reinhard Selten

Models of Strategic Rationality

THEORY AND DECISION LIBRARY SERIES C, GAME THEORY, MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING, AND OPERATIONS RESEARCH

Hardcover Published: 29th February 1988
ISBN: 9789027726636
Number Of Pages: 318

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The papers collected in this volume relate to game theory. They aim at the elaboration and discussion of basic con­ cepts, at the analysis of specific applied models and at the evaluation of experimental evidence. A game is a mathematical model of a situation where several actors with different goals are engaged in strategic inter­ action. Game theory explores the nature and the consequence. s of rational behavior in games. With respect to several papers in this volume, it seems to be appropriate to comment on later developments. A list of some important references is given at the end of the intro­ duction. References already included in the collected pa­ pers are not repeated here. In casual conversation colleagues sometimes observe that the author on the one hand goes to extremes in the elabora­ tion of the consequences of Bayesian rationality and on the other hand strongly emphasizes the limited rationality of actual decision behavior. This seeming discrepancy is also expressed in the collection presented here. The author thinks that a sharp distinction should be made between nor­ ~ative and descriptive game theory. This position of "methodological dualism" has been expressed in a comment to Aumann's paper "What is game theory trying to accomplish?" (Aumann, 1985, Selten 1985) Normative game theory has the important task to explore the nature and the consequences of idealized full rationality in strategic interaction. This requires a thorough discuss­ ion of first principles. Empirical arguments are irrelevant here.

1. Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games.- 2. The Chain Store Paradox.- 3. A Note on Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in Asymmetric Animal Conflicts.- 4. A Simple Game Model of Kidnapping.- 5. A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition where 4 Are Few and 6 Are Many.- 6. A Model of Oligopolistic Size Structure and Profitability.- 7. Are Cartel Laws Bad for Business?.- 8. Bargaining under Incomplete Information - A Numerical Example.- 9. A Noncooperative Model of Characteristic-Function Bargaining.- 10. The Equity Principle in Economic Behavior.- 11. Coalition Probabilities in a Non-Cooperative Model of Three-Person Quota-Game Bargaining.- 12. Equal Division Payoff Bounds for Three-Person Characteristic Function Experiments.- Author Index.

ISBN: 9789027726636
ISBN-10: 9027726639
Series: THEORY AND DECISION LIBRARY SERIES C, GAME THEORY, MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING, AND OPERATIONS RESEARCH
Audience: Professional
Format: Hardcover
Language: English
Number Of Pages: 318
Published: 29th February 1988
Publisher: Springer
Country of Publication: NL
Dimensions (cm): 24.77 x 17.15  x 2.54
Weight (kg): 0.73