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Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction : Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision Theory - Cristina Bicchieri

Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction

Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision Theory

Hardcover

Published: 28th August 1992
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In recent years there has been a great deal of interaction among game theorists, philosophers, and logicians in certain foundational problems concerning rationality, the formalization of knowledge and practical reasoning, and models of learning and deliberation. This unique volume brings together the work of some of the preeminent figures in their respective disciplines, all of whom are engaged in research at the forefront of their fields. Together they offer a conspectus of the interaction of game theory, logic, and epistemology in the formal models of knowledge, belief, deliberation, and learning and in the relationship between Bayesian decision theory and game theory, as well as between bounded rationality and computational complexity.

"...a first class collection of essays that should both advance the foundations of modern game theory and give philosophers an excellent and up-to-date view as to what is going on in this recently and increasingly important area of philosophy." Ellery Eells, University of Wisconsin

Preface
Feasibility
Elicitation for games
Equilibrium, common knowledge, and optimal sequential decisions
Rational choice in the context of ideal games
Hyperrational games: concept and resolutions
Equilibria and the dynamics of rational deliberation
Tortuous labyrinth: noncooperative normal-form games between hyperrational players
On consistency properties of some strongly implementable social choice rules with endogenous agenda formation
Algorithmic knowledge and game theory
Possible worlds, counterfactuals, and epistemic operators
Semantical aspects of quantified modal logic
Epistemic logic and game theory
Abstract notions of simultaneous equilibrium and their uses
Representing facts
Introduction to metamoral
The logic of Ulam's games with lies
The acquisition of common knowledge
The electronic mail game: strategic behavior under 'almost common knowledge'
Knowledge-depentent games: backward induction
Common knowledge and games with perfect information
Game solutions and the normal form
The dynamics of belief systems: foundations versus coherence theories
Counterfactuals and a theory of equilibrium in games
Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved.

ISBN: 9780521416740
ISBN-10: 0521416744
Series: Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision Theory
Audience: Professional
Format: Hardcover
Language: English
Number Of Pages: 432
Published: 28th August 1992
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Country of Publication: GB
Dimensions (cm): 22.8 x 15.2  x 2.9
Weight (kg): 0.8