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Knowledge and Evidence : Cambridge Studies in Philosophy - Paul K. Moser

Knowledge and Evidence

Cambridge Studies in Philosophy

By: Paul K. Moser, Ernest Sosa (Editor), Jonathan Dancy (Editor), John Haldane (Editor), Gilbert Harman (Editor)

Paperback Published: 9th December 1991
ISBN: 9780521423632
Number Of Pages: 300

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Paul Moser's book defends what has been an unfashionable view in recent epistemology: the foundationalist account of knowledge and justification. Since the time of Plato philosophers have wondered what exactly knowledge is. This book develops a new account of perceptual knowledge which specifies the exact sense in which knowledge has foundations. The author argues that experiential foundations are indeed essential to perceptual knowledge, and he explains what knowledge requires beyond justified true beliefs. In challenging prominent sceptical claims that we have no justified beliefs about the external world, the book outlines a theory of rational belief.

'Moser has produced a foundationalist account of justification and knowledge ... that in some respects is superior to anything else in the literature.' W. Alston, Syracuse University 'Paul Moser's book is a powerful antidote to the naive but morally and intellectually damaging 'relativism', that pervades much contemporary social and literary theory, but it is much more than that. Unfashionably but persuasively, Moser defends a foundationalist epistemology and a verison of the correspondence theory of truth.' The Times Higher Education Supplement

Acknowledgmentsp. xi
Introductionp. 1
Conditions for propositional knowledgep. 13
Beliefp. 13
Truth as minimal correspondencep. 23
Truth as correspondencep. 24
The minimal correspondence definitionp. 26
Criticisms and repliesp. 29
Epistemic justificationp. 35
Conclusionp. 45
Minimal epistemic reasonsp. 47
Minimal epistemic reasons for beliefp. 47
Propositional probability-makersp. 52
Against the Thesis of Self-Probabilityp. 55
Against Probability Infinitismp. 56
Circular Probability and Probability Coherentismp. 60
Summary and generalized argumentp. 63
Nonpropositional probability-makersp. 69
Against Externalismp. 71
Against Radical Externalismp. 71
Against Moderate Externalismp. 74
A positive lessonp. 77
Internalism and unconditional probability-makersp. 77
Modes of awarenessp. 80
Unconditional probability-makersp. 88
Internalism unifiedp. 107
Internalism and derivative probability-makersp. 112
Nonoccurrent probability-makers and memoryp. 117
Conclusionp. 125
Justifying epistemic reasonsp. 126
Justification and overbalancing probabilityp. 126
Unconditional overbalancing probabilityp. 127
Derivative overbalancing probabilityp. 131
The insufficiency of overbalancing probabilityp. 134
Justification and maximal probabilityp. 136
Unconditional and derivative justifiersp. 136
Justifiability and justifiednessp. 141
Some logical mattersp. 145
Having a justifying reason for beliefp. 151
The evidential basing relationp. 156
Against justification skepticismp. 158
Conclusionp. 164
Foundationalism and some alternativesp. 166
Foundationalism is not a mistakep. 166
Two problems for coherentismp. 172
A dilemma for internalist coherentismp. 173
The isolation objectionp. 176
Against epistemological behaviorismp. 183
The given is not a mythp. 186
Epistemic reliabilism and relevant worldsp. 194
Three variations on reliabilismp. 195
Normal-world reliabilismp. 196
Reliabilism rejectedp. 202
Conclusionp. 204
Procedural epistemic rationalityp. 205
Cartesian truth-seekersp. 210
A plethora of epistemic objectivesp. 213
Purely quantitative approachesp. 213
Nonquantitative approachesp. 217
An evidential epistemic objectivep. 223
Conclusionp. 231
Propositional knowledgep. 232
Epistemic explanation and the Gettier problemp. 235
Knowledge and truth-resistant evidencep. 242
Knowledge skepticism and meta-justificationp. 255
Knowledge and a Cartesian Dreamer Hypothesisp. 255
Explanatory particularism and the problem of the criterionp. 260
Conclusionp. 265
Referencesp. 267
Indexp. 281
Table of Contents provided by Syndetics. All Rights Reserved.

ISBN: 9780521423632
ISBN-10: 0521423635
Series: Cambridge Studies in Philosophy
Audience: Professional
Format: Paperback
Language: English
Number Of Pages: 300
Published: 9th December 1991
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Country of Publication: GB
Dimensions (cm): 21.6 x 14.0  x 1.7
Weight (kg): 0.38