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Kant and the Mind - Andrew Brook

Kant and the Mind

Paperback Published: 8th September 1997
ISBN: 9780521574419
Number Of Pages: 344

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Kant made a number of highly original discoveries about the mind--about its ability to synthesize a single, coherent representation of self and world, about the unity it must have to do so, and about the mind's awareness of itself and the semantic apparatus it uses to achieve this awareness. The past fifty years have seen intense activity in research on human cognition. Even so, not only have Kant's discoveries not been superseded, some of them have not even been assimilated into current thinking. That is particularly true of his work on unity and on the semantic apparatus of self-awareness.

Industry Reviews

' ... this will be recognised as one of the most important books ever on Kant'. Philosophical Studies 'The book is to be recommended primarily to philosophers ... for its having ... shown the importance of ... Kant's ... unity of consciousness. It is also to be recommended to cognitive psychologists for presenting a Kant who is to be less lightly treated than he usually is in psychology.' Journal of the History of Behavioural Sciences ' ... novel ideas on important topics, forcefully presented so they cannot be disregarded.' Mind

Prefacep. xi
The contemporary relevance of Kant's workp. 1
Kant's contributionp. 1
Kant, functionalism, and cognitive sciencep. 12
The resistance of materialistsp. 14
Kant's theory of the subjectp. 24
The need for a subjectp. 24
'One single experience': the unity of experiencep. 31
Kant's doctrine of synthesisp. 34
The unity of consciousnessp. 37
The kind of unity we havep. 40
Tying it all together: the mind as a representationp. 43
Kant's conception of awareness and self-awarenessp. 46
Defining 'Bewusstsein': outer and inner sensep. 47
Two forms of self-awarenessp. 55
'Bewusstsein': awareness without self-awareness?p. 58
What is special about apperceptive self-awareness?p. 63
Kant's theory of apperceptive self-awarenessp. 70
Transcendental designation: the referential base of self-awarenessp. 71
The sources of self-awarenessp. 77
The global representation: theory of the representational basep. 80
Why apperceptive self-awareness is the way it isp. 85
Coda: transcendental and empirical aspects of the selfp. 90
The mind in the Critique of Pure Reasonp. 95
Kant's critical project and how the mind fits into itp. 96
The location of the subjective deduction in the first editionp. 108
The attack on the Paralogisms in the first edition: synthesis and self-awarenessp. 110
The mind and its awareness of itself in the second editionp. 113
The Fourth Paralogism and the Refutation of Idealismp. 117
Interpretive perplexitiesp. 118
The first-edition subjective deduction: the object of 'one experience'p. 119
Synthesis and Unityp. 120
What is a subjective deduction, and why did Kant offer one?p. 120
Kitcher and Kant's doctrine of synthesisp. 122
Apprehension, reproduction, and recognition in conceptsp. 124
Apperception and the unity of individual objectsp. 130
Transcendental apperception: the unity of 'all appearances'p. 132
Synchronic unityp. 141
The Strange Case of Self-Awareness and the Deductionp. 144
Apperception and self-awarenessp. 144
Why did Kant introduce self-awareness into the deduction?p. 147
Kant's diagnosis of the Second Paralogismp. 152
The Paralogismsp. 154
Three claims from the subjective deductionp. 156
The introductory remarks: the strategies of rational psychologyp. 160
The arguments for the Second Paralogismp. 165
The fourth part of Kant's discussionp. 177
The Third Paralogism: unity without identity over timep. 179
Situating the Third Paralogismp. 180
The structure of Kant's discussionp. 183
Does unity or memory require identity?p. 185
Kant and Hume versus Butler and Reid, and Strawson, toop. 191
To what extent is the unity of consciousness diachronic?p. 195
Unity as the form of thought: 'time is...in me'p. 197
Identifying the subject with an objectp. 201
Results and attitudep. 205
The second-edition subjective deduction: self-representing representationsp. 208
Homunculi and self-representing representationsp. 208
The second-edition Transcendental Deductionp. 212
[section]15: synthesis in the second editionp. 214
[section]16 and [section]17: the new version of the central argumentp. 216
The mind as representationp. 223
Self-representation and self-awarenessp. 230
Mind as representation: final considerationsp. 233
Nature and awareness of the selfp. 235
What the subject is and what we can know about itp. 235
Is a subject merely a formal requirement?p. 237
[section]18: empirical versus transcendental apperception; foundationalismp. 242
[section]24 and [section]25: self-awareness and the noumenal mindp. 246
Why immediate awareness of the noumenal mind is not knowledgep. 252
Why did Kant claim that we are immediately aware of the noumenal mind?p. 254
Coda: the mind in the two versions of the deductionp. 256
Concluding remarksp. 258
Notesp. 260
Bibliographyp. 291
Index of passages citedp. 297
General indexp. 300
Table of Contents provided by Syndetics. All Rights Reserved.

ISBN: 9780521574419
ISBN-10: 0521574412
Audience: Professional
Format: Paperback
Language: English
Number Of Pages: 344
Published: 8th September 1997
Country of Publication: GB
Dimensions (cm): 22.94 x 15.14  x 1.93
Weight (kg): 0.47