Robert Hanna presents a fresh view of the Kantian and analytic traditions that have dominated continental European and Anglo-American philosophy over the last two centuries, and of the relation between them. The rise of analytic philosophy decisively marked the end of the hundred-year dominance of Kant's philosophy in Europe. But Hanna shows that the analytic tradition also emerged from Kant's philosophy in the sense that its members were able to define and
legitimate their ideas only by means of an intensive, extended engagement with, and a partial or complete rejection of, the Critical Philosophy. Hanna's book therefore comprises both an interpretative study of Kant's massive and seminal Critique of Pure Reason, and a critical essay on the historical
foundations of analytic philosophy from Frege to Quine.
Hanna considers Kant's key doctrines in the Critique in the light of their reception and transmission by the leading figures of the analytic tradition-Frege, Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap, and Quine. But this is not just a study in the history of philosophy, for out of this emerges Hanna's original approach to two much-contested theories that remain at the heart of contemporary philosophy. Hanna puts forward a new 'cognitive-semantic' interpretation of transcendental idealism, and a
vigorous defence of Kant's theory of analytic and synthetic necessary truth. These will make Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy compelling reading not just for specialists in the history of philosophy, but for all who are interested in these fundamental philosophical issues.
`Review from previous edition interesting and provocative ... well worth reading. If there is a tendency to oversimplify Kant's role in shaping early analytic philosophy, i.e. to see Kant as the proponent of views that the analysts, with ample justification, reacted against, and which they happily succeeded in demolishing once and for all, Hanna's book will serve as a helpful corrective.'
Journal of the History of Philosophy
1: Kant and the Semantic Problem
2: How are Cognitions Possible?
3: Analyticity within the Limits of Cognition Alone
4: The Significance of Syntheticity
5: Necessity Restricted: The Synthetic A Priori
Concluding Un-Quinean Postscript