Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent Gulf War had a traumatic effect on the Middle East and its implications were particularly serious for Israel, which felt obliged to reassess its strategic and military perspectives.
This is an examination of the lessons that the Gulf War holds for Israel. It analyzes the surface-to-surface missile strikes on the country, focusing on their scope and dimension, and looks at Israeli efforts to cope with these attacks. It examines the role of air power and qualitative weaponry, and the part it played in winning the war. The American intelligence effort is discussed, with particular emphasis on its shortcomings.
Brigadier General Learan investigates Iraq's non-use of chemical weapons, identifying the reasons for this restrains and pointing out how Israel's chemical protection policy, and its failure to respond to Iraq's missile attacks, were mistaken and had a negative effect on Israel's deterrence posture both during and after the war. He concludes by discussing the minimised risk of war in the region, despite a continuing military build-up in neighbouring countries, and ends with an analysis of the implications of the war for Israel's defence doctrine.
|SSM attacks on Israel|
|the role of air power and quantitative weaponry in the war|
|functioning of US intelligence in the crisis and the war|
|Iraq refraining from chemical warfare|
|reasons and implications|
|Israel's self-restraint and its deterrence posture|
|diminished risk of war despite persistent military build-up|
|implications of the Second Gulf War for Israel's defence doctrine|
|principal findings and conclusions|
|Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved.|
Series: Besa Studies in International Security
Audience: Tertiary; University or College
Number Of Pages: 184
Published: 1st April 1997
Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
Country of Publication: GB
Dimensions (cm): 21.59 x 14.61 x 1.91
Weight (kg): 0.23
Edition Number: 1