Breaking with the tradition that literature about the direction and coordination of military forces should only deal with technology and procedures, this work also takes into account the underlying domestic conditions of a conflict, including cultural, personal and political relations. The book focuses on two instances, where fundamental assumptions were at loggerheads and provides a theoretical "nuts and bolts" approach introduced within the opening chapters.
Firstly, the book investigates the effect of the several armies present "in the field" without any central authority during March 1918. It explores how this expensive luxury, as the Germans threatened to destroy the allied forces, caused internal British disagreements over strategy which weakened the British Expeditionary Force.
The second case analyses how Norway tumbled into war in 1940. The Norwegian government had a tacit, incoherent and ill-coordinated plan for how they should once again keep Norway out of war. As a consequence, the de facto decision to resist German aggression was in fact taken by a rather insignificant colonel. This case demonstrates how the underlying conditions of command and control and not the actual directives from the government were the historical focus which determined Norway's destiny.
"The author samples post-September 11 writings from Arab and other Muslim press, examining the terminology used in describing the attacks in New York City and Washington D.C. as well as their treatment of Islamic fundamentalism."
-"Middle East Journal