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Intrinsic Value : Concept and Warrant - Noah M. Lemos

Intrinsic Value

Concept and Warrant

Hardcover

Published: 30th September 1994
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This book addresses some basic questions about intrinsic value: What is it? What has it? What justifies our beliefs about it? In the first six chapters the author defends the existence of a plurality of intrinsic goods, the thesis of organic unities, the view that some goods are 'higher' than others, and the view that intrinsic value can be explicated in terms of 'fitting' emotional attitudes. The final three chapters explore the justification of our beliefs about intrinsic value, including coherence theories and the idea that some value beliefs are warranted on the basis of emotional experience. Professor Lemos defends the view that some value beliefs enjoy 'modest' a priori justification. The book is intended primarily for professional philosophers and their graduate students working in ethics, value theory, and epistemology.

"...the discussions of higher goods and moral epistemology are quite useful, and the book as a whole is valuable in offering an unusually systematic treatment of a central concept of ethical theory." Ethics "In each case the discussion is controlled and acute and the conclusions provide significant challenges." Canadian Philosophical Reviews "Despite its rather slender size, Professor Lemos's book is philosophically very rich." Paul Eisenberg, International Philosophical Quarterly

Preface
Acknowledgments
Value, plurality, parts, and wholes
The concept of intrinsic valuep. 3
Correct emotion and intrinsic valuep. 6
Some objections to this approachp. 16
The bearers of intrinsic valuep. 20
The bearers of value: Abstract objectsp. 20
The bearers of value: Concrete particularsp. 26
Organic unities and the principle of universalityp. 32
Examples of organic unitiesp. 34
The principle of universalityp. 40
Higher goods and the myth of Tithonusp. 48
Higher goodsp. 48
The principle of rankp. 55
Higher goods and Mill's distinctionp. 59
Higher goods and the principle of summationp. 61
Pleasure and its intrinsic valuep. 67
Sensory and nonsensory pleasurep. 67
Pleasure and displeasure in the good, bad, and neutralp. 73
True and false pleasuresp. 77
Hedonismp. 80
The value of desire satisfactionp. 84
Consciousness, knowledge, and the consciousness thesisp. 88
The consciousness thesis and the value of nonsentient lifep. 93
Beautyp. 97
Value pluralism and its problemsp. 99
Naturalism, nonnaturalism, and warrant
The distinctiveness of intrinsic valuep. 103
The objects of ordinary ethical belief and knowledgep. 103
Nonnaturalism and traditional naturalismp. 107
The identity thesis and intentional criteria of identityp. 112
Constitutional naturalismp. 118
Ethical facts and the explanatory requirementp. 125
Naturalism and analysisp. 129
Intrinsic value and modest a priori justificationp. 134
Preliminary remarks and assumptionsp. 134
A strong conception of a priori knowledgep. 139
Modest a priori knowledge and justificationp. 144
The concept of an intrinsically acceptable propositionp. 152
Coherence and experiencep. 161
Coherence theoriesp. 161
The regress argument and the doxastic ascent argumentp. 163
Some objections to coherence theoriesp. 173
Emotional and moral experience as reasons for beliefp. 180
Mere emotions as a reason for value beliefsp. 191
Appendix A: Chisholm's definition of organic unityp. 196
Appendix B: Some naturalistic analysesp. 201
Selected bibliographyp. 208
Indexp. 213
Table of Contents provided by Blackwell. All Rights Reserved.

ISBN: 9780521462075
ISBN-10: 052146207X
Series: Cambridge Studies in Philosophy
Audience: Professional
Format: Hardcover
Language: English
Number Of Pages: 236
Published: 30th September 1994
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Country of Publication: GB
Dimensions (cm): 21.6 x 13.8  x 1.7
Weight (kg): 0.45