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Identity, Character, and Morality : Essays in Moral Psychology - Owen J. Flanagan

Identity, Character, and Morality

Essays in Moral Psychology

By: Owen J. Flanagan (Editor), Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Editor)

Paperback

Published: 26th August 1993
For Ages: 18+ years old
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Many philosophers believe that normative ethics is in principle independent of psychology. By contrast, the authors of these essays explore the interconnections between psychology and moral theory. They investigate the psychological constraints on realizable ethical ideals and articulate the psychological assumptions behind traditional ethics. They also examine the ways in which the basic architecture of the mind, core emotions, patterns of individual development, social psychology, and the limits on human capacities for rational deliberation affect morality.Owen Flanagan is Professor of Philosophy at Duke University. Am‹¨«lie Oksenberg Rorty is Professor of Philosophy at Mount Holyoke College.

Acknowledgments
Introduction
Identity, Commitment and Agency
Aspects of Identity and Agency
Identity and the Centrality of Traits
Aspects of Personal Identity
Relative Centrality of Aspects
Identity and Practical Deliberation
The Pragmatic Implications of Identity Attribution
Notes
Identity and Strong and Weak Evaluation
The Moral Life of a Pragmatist
Character, Temperament, and Emotion
Natural Affection and Responsibility for Character: A Critique of Kantian Views of the V...
On the Old Saw That Character Is Destiny
Restoring the Connection between Character and Behavior
Character and Language: The Figurative Turn
Constitutive Misfortune and Acting in Character
Understanding Action from the "Inside"
Notes
Hume and Moral Emotions
Introduction
The Received View about Hume on Emotions
Natural
Natural and Normative
Emotions as Complexes
Moral Emotion and Subjectivity
Notes
The Place of Emotions in Kantian Morality
Emotions Matter in Moral Assessment
The Kantian Accommodation
Evaluating These Claims
Notes
Moral Psychology and the Social Virtues
Vocation, Friendship, and Community: Limitations of the Personal-Impersonal Framework
Gender and Moral Luck
Women and Care
Women's Luck and Modern Ethical Theory
Conclusions
Postscript
Notes
Friendship and Duty: Some Difficult Relations
Why Must and How Might Friendship Be Governed by Duty?
Moral Chauvinism
The Implications of Some Bad Acts of Friendship
The Importance of Duty
Conclusion
Notes
Trust, Affirmation, and Moral Character: A Critique of Kantian Morality
Prediction and Trust
Prediction and Kantian Moral Theory
One Thought Too Many
The Value of Trust
Notes
Why Honesty Is a Hard Virtue
Note
Rationality, Responsibility, and Morality Higher-Order Discrimination
Reciprocal First-Order Discrimination
Higher-Order Political Discrimination
Nonstereotypical Higher-Order Discrimination
Reciprocal Higher-Order Discrimination
Higher-Order Discrimination: A Species of Pseudorationality
Some Familiar Examples of Higher-Order Discrimination
Abettors of Higher-Order Discrimination
Higher-Order Discrimination: A Case of n-Level Pseudorationality
Notes
Obligation and Performance: A Kantian Account of Moral Conflict
Rational Egoism, Self, and Others
A Skeptical Challenge
A Subjective Egoist Justification of Morality
A Strategic Defense
Problems with the Strategic Justification of Morality
An Objective-Egoist Justification of Morality: A Neo-Aristotelian Approach
The Problem of Fission
An Egoist Account of Fission: The Base Case for Extending Egoist Concern to Others
Intimates: Extending Egoist Concern Further
Why Cultivate Other-Selves?
Justifying Morality: Extending Egoist Concern Further Still
Degrees of Egoist Concern
The Scope of Egoist Concern: Still Too Narrow?
Is the Egoist's Concern for Other-Selves Too Mercenary?
Prospects for an Egoist Justification of Morality
Notes
Is Akratic Action Always Irrational?
Why Is Continence Rational and Incontinence Irrational?
The Irrationality of the Sources of Akratic Action: Emotion and Desire
Does the Akratic Choose the Less Rational Course of Action?
Renegade Reasons versus New Considerations
Rationality in Action as Evaluative Consistency
Revise or Be Continent
Obstinacy and Continence
Notes
Rationality, Responsibility, and Pathological Indifference
Pathological Indifference
Ideal Reflective Equilibria
The Dilemma Regarding Responsibility
The Dilemma with Regard to Rationality
Internal Justification and Rationality
Notes
Virtue Theory
Some Advantages of Virtue Ethics
Moral Asymmetry
The Symmetry in Virtue
How Ordinary Morality and Kantian Morality Devalue Moral Agents
The Incoherence of Commonsense Moral Thinking
Notes
On the Primacy of Character
Bibliography
Contributors
Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved.

ISBN: 9780262560740
ISBN-10: 0262560747
Series: Identity, Character, and Morality
Audience: Professional
For Ages: 18+ years old
Format: Paperback
Language: English
Number Of Pages: 504
Published: 26th August 1993
Publisher: MIT Press Ltd
Country of Publication: US
Dimensions (cm): 22.9 x 15.2  x 3.0
Weight (kg): 0.82
Edition Type: New edition