the Logische Untersuchungen,l phenomenology has been conceived as a substratum of empirical psychology, as a sphere comprising "imma nental" descriptions of psychical mental processes, a sphere compris ing descriptions that - so the immanence in question is understood - are strictly confined within the bounds of internal experience. It 2 would seem that my protest against this conception has been oflittle avail; and the added explanations, which sharply pinpointed at least some chief points of difference, either have not been understood or have been heedlessly pushed aside. Thus the replies directed against my criticism of psychological method are also quite negative because they miss the straightforward sense of my presentation. My criticism of psychological method did not at all deny the value of modern psychology, did not at all disparage the experimental work done by eminent men. Rather it laid bare certain, in the literal sense, radical defects of method upon the removal of which, in my opinion, must depend an elevation of psychology to a higher scientific level and an extraordinary amplification ofits field of work. Later an occasion will be found to say a few words about the unnecessary defences of psychology against my supposed "attacks.
One Essence and Eidetic Cognition.- One Matter of Fact and Essence.- x 1. Natural Cognition and Experience.- x 2. Matter of Fact. Inseparability of Matter of Fact and Essence.- x 3. Eidetic Seeing and Intuition of Something Individual.- x 4. Eidetic Seeing and Phantasy. Eidetic Cognition Independent of All Cognition of Matters of Fact.- x 5. Judgments About Essences and Judgments Having Eidetic Universal Validity.- x 6. Some Fundamental Concepts. Universality and Necessity.- x 7. Sciences of Matters of Fact and Eidetic Sciences.- x 8. Relationships of Dependence Between Science of Matters of Fact and Eidetic Science.- x 9. Region and Regional Eidetics.- x 10. Region and Category. The Analytic Region and Its Categories.- x 11. Syntactical Objectivities and Ultimate Substrates. Syntactical Categories.- x 12. Genus and Species.- x 13. Generalization and Formalization.- x 14. Substrate-Categories. The Substrate-Essence and the Todi Ti.- x 15. Selfsufficient and Non-selfsufficient Objects. Concretum and Individuum.- x 16. Region and Category in the Materially Filled Sphere. Synthetical Cognitions A Priori.- x 17. Conclusion of Our Logical Considerations.- Two Naturalistic Misinterpretations.- x 18. Introduction to the Critical Discussions.- x 19. The Empiricistic Identification of Experience and the Originarily Presentive Act.- x 20. Empiricism as Skepticism.- x 21. Obscurities on the Idealistic Side.- x 22. The Reproach of Platonic Realism. Essence and Concept.- x 23. The Spontaneity of Ideation. Essence and Fictum.- x 24. The Principle of All Principles.- x 25. In Praxis: The Positivist as Scientific Investigator of Nature. In Reflection: The Scientific Investigator as Positivist.- x 26. Sciences of the Dogmatic and Sciences of the Philosophical Attitude.- Two The Considerations Fundamental to Phenomenology.- One The Positing Which Belongs to the Natural Attitude and Its Exclusion.- x 27. The world of the Natural Attitude: I and My Surrounding World.- x 28. The Cogito. My Natural Surrounding World and the Ideal Surrounding Worlds.- x 29. The "Other" Ego-Subjects and the Intersubjective Natural Surrounding World.- x 30. The General Positing Which Characterizes the Natural Attitude.- x 31. Radical Alteration of the Natural Positing. "Excluding," "Parenthesizing.".- x 32. The Phenomenological ?????.- Two Consciousness and Natural Actuality.- x 33. Preliminary Indication of "Pure" or "Transcendental" Consciousness As the Phenomenological Residuum.- x 34. The Essence of Consciousness as Theme.- x 35. The Cogito as "Act." Non-actionality Modification.- x 36. Intentive Mental Processes. Mental Process Taken Universally.- x 37. The Pure Ego's "Directedness-to" Within the Cogito and the Heeding Which Seizes Upon.- x 38. Reflections on Acts. Perception of Something Immanent and of Something Transcendent.- x 39. Consciousness and Natural Actuality. The "Naive" Human Being's Conception.- x 40. "Primary" and "Secondary" Qualities. The Physical Thing Given "In Person" a "Mere Appearance" of the "True Physical Thing" Determined in Physics.- x 41. The Really Inherent Composition of Perception and Its Transcendent Object.- x 42. Being as Consciousness and Being as Reality. Essentially Necessary Difference Between the Modes of Intuition.- x 43. The Clarification of a Fundamental Error.- x 44. Merely Phenomenal Being of Something Transcendent, Absolute Being of Something Immanent.- x 45. Unperceived Mental Processes, Unperceived Reality.- x 46. Indubitability of the Perception of Something Immanent, Dubitability of the Perception of Something Transcendent.- Three The Region of Pure Consciousness.- x 47. The Natural World as a Correlate of Consciousness.- x 48. The Logical Possibility and the Material Countersense of a World Outside Ours.- x 49. Absolute Consciousness as the Residuum After the Annihilation of the World.- x 50. The Phenomenological Attitude; Pure Consciousness as the Field of Phenomenology.- x 51. The Signification of the Transcendental Preliminary Considerations.- x 52. Supplementations. The Physical Thing as Determined by Physics and the "Unknown Cause of Appearance.".- x 53. Animalia and Psychological Consciousness.- x 54. Continuation. The Transcendent Psychological Mental Process Accidental and Relative; the Transcendental Mental Process Necessary and Absolute.- x 55. Conclusion. All Reality Existent by Virtue of "Sense-bestowal." Not a "Subjective Idealism.".- Four The Phenomenological Reductions.- x 56. The Question About the Range of the Phenomenological Reduction. Natural and Cultural Sciences.- x 57. The Question of the Exclusion of the Pure Ego.- x 58. The Transcendency, God, Excluded.- x 59. The Transcendency of the Eidetic. Exclusion of Pure Logic as Mathesis Universalis.- x 60. The Exclusion of Material-Eidetic Disciplines.- x 61. The Methodological Signification of the Systematic Theory of Phenomenological Reductions.- x 62. Epistemological Anticipations. The "Dogmatic" and the Phenomenological Attitude.- Three Methods and Problems of Pure Phenomenology.- One Preliminary Methodic Deliberations.- x 63. The Particular Significance of Methodic Deliberations for Phenomenology.- x 64. The Phenomenologist's Self-Exclusion.- x 65. The Reflexive Reference of Phenomenology to Itself.- x 66. Faithful Expression of Clear Data. Unambiguous Terms.- x 67. The Method of Clarification, "Nearness of Givenness" and "Remoteness of Givenness.".- x 68. Genuine and Spurious Degrees of Clarity. The Essence of Normal Clarification.- x 69. The Method of Perfectly Clear Seizing Upon Essences.- x 70. The Role of Perception in the Method of Eidetic Clarification. The Primacy of Free Phantasy.- x 71. The Problem of the Possibility of a Descriptive Eidetics of Mental Processes.- x 72. Eidetic Sciences: Concrete, Abstract, "Mathematical.".- x 73. Application to the Problem of Phenomenology. Description and Exact Determination.- x 74. Descriptive and Exact Sciences.- x 75. Phenomenology as a Descriptive Eidetic Doctrine of Pure Mental Processes.- Two Universal Structures of Pure Consciousness.- x 76. The Theme of the Following Investigations.- x 77. Reflection as a Fundamental Peculiarity of the Sphere of Mental Processes. Studies in Reflection.- x 78. The Phenomenological Study of Reflections on Mental Processes.- x 79. Critical Excursis. Phenomenology and the Difficulties of "Self-Observation.".- x 80. The Relationship of Mental Processes to the Pure Ego.- x 81. Phenomenological Time and Consciousness of Time.- x 82. Continuation. The Three-fold Horizon of Mental Processes As At The Same Time the Horizon of Reflection On Mental Processes.- x 83. Seizing Upon the Unitary Stream of Mental Processes as "Idea.".- x 84. Intentionality as Principal Theme of Phenomenology.- x 85. Sensuous ???, Intentive ?????.- x 86. The Functional Problems.- Three Noesis and Noema.- x 87. Preliminary Remarks.- x 88. Really Inherent and Intentive Components of Mental Processes. The Noema.- x 89. Noematic Statements and Statements About Actuality. The Noema in the Psychological Sphere.- x 90. The "Noematic Sense" and the Distinction Between "Immanental" and "Actual Objects.".- x 91. Extension to the Widest Sphere of Intentionality.- x 92. The Noetic and Noematic Aspects of Attentional Changes.- x 93. Transition to the Noetic-Noematic Structures of the Higher Spheres of Consciousness.- x 94. Noesis and Noema in the Realm of Judgment.- x 95. The Analogous Distinctions in the Emotional and Volitional Spheres.- x 96. Transition to Further Chapters. Concluding Remarks.- Four The Set of Problems Pertaining to Noetic-Noematic Structures.- x 97. The Hyletic and Noetic Moments as Really Inherent Moments, the Noematic Moments as Really Non-Inherent Moments, of Mental Processes.- x 98. The Mode of Being of the Noema. Theory of Forms of Noeses. Theory of Forms of Noemata.- x 99. The Noematic Core and Its Characteristics in the Sphere of Original Presentations and Presentiations.- x 100. Eidetically Lawful Hierarchical Formations of Objectivations in the Noesis and Noema.- x 101. Characteristics of Levels. Different Sorts of "Reflections.".- x 102. Transition to New Dimensions of Characterizations.- x 103. Belief-characteristics and Being-characteristics.- x 104. The Doxic Modalities as Modifications.- x 105. Belief-Modality as Belief, Being-Modality as Being.- x 106. Affirmation and Denial Along With Their Noematic Correlations.- x 107 Reiterated Modifications.- x 108. Noematic Characteristics Not Determinations Produced by "Reflection.".- x 109. The Neutrality Modification.- x 110. Neutralized Consciousness and Legitimation of Reason. Assuming.- x 111. The Neutrality Modification and Phantasy.- x 112. Reiterability of the Phantasy Modification. Non-Reiterability of the Neutrality Modification.- x 113. Actual and Potential Positings.- x 114. Further Concerning the Potentiality of Positing and Neutrality Modification.- x 115. Applications. The Broadened Concept of an Act. Effectings of an Act. Arousals of an Act.- x 116. Transition to New Analyses. The Founded Noeses and Their Noematic Correlates.- x 117. The Founded Positings and the Conclusion of the Doctrine of Neutrality Modifications. The Universal Concept of Positing.- x 118. Syntheses of Consciousness. Syntactical Forms.- x 119. The Transmutation of Polythetical and Monothetical Acts.- x 120. Positionality and Neutrality in the Sphere of Syntheses.- x 121. Doxic Syntaxes in the Emotional and Volitional Spheres.- x 122. Modes of Effectuation of the Articulated Syntheses. "Theme.".- x 123. Confusion and Distinctness as Modes of Effectuation of Synthetical Acts.- x 124. The Noetic-Noematic Stratum of "Logos." Signifying and Signification.- x 125. The Modalities of Effectuation in the Logical-Expressive Sphere and the Method of Clarification.- x 126. Completeness and Universality of Expression.- x 127. The Expression of Judgments and the Expression of Emotional Noemas.- Four Reason and Actuality.- One The Noematic Sense and the Relation to the Object.- x 128. Introduction.- x 129. "Content" and "Object;" the Content as "Sense.".- x 130. Delimitation of the Essence, "Noematic Sense.".- x 131. The "Object," the "Determinable X in the Noematic Sense.".- x 132. The Core As a Sense in the Mode Belonging to its Fullness.- x 133. The Noematic Positum. Posited and Synthetic Posita. Posita in the Realm of Objectivations.- x 134. The Doctine of Apophantic Forms.- x 135. Object and Consciousness. The Transition to the Phenomenology of Reason.- Two Phenomenology of Reason.- x 136. The First Fundamental Form of Rational Consciousness: Originarily Presentive "Seeing.".- x 137. Evidence and Intellectual Sight. "Ordinary" and "Pure" Evidence, Assertoric and Apodictic Evidence.- x 138. Adequate and Inadequate Evidence.- x 139. The Interweaving of All Kinds of Reason. Theoretical, Axiological and Practical Truth.- x 140. Confirmation. Justification Without Evidence. Equivalence of Positional and Neutral Intellectual Sight.- x 141. Immediate and Mediate Rational Positing. Mediate Evidence.- x 142. Rational Positing and Being.- x 143. Adequate Physical Thing-Givenness as Idea in the Kantian Sense.- x 144. Actuality and Originary Presentive Consciousness: Concluding Determinations.- x 145. Critical Considerations Concerning the Phenomenology of Evidence.- Three The Levels of Universality Pertaining to The Problems of the Theory of Reason.- x 146. The Most Universal Problems.- x 147. Ramifications of the Problem. Formal Logic, Axiology and Theory of Practice.- x 148. Problems of the Theory of Reason Pertaining to Formal Ontology.- x 149. The Problems of the Theory of Reason Pertaining to Regional Ontologies. The Problem of Phenomenological Constitution.- x 150. Continuation. The Region, Physical Thing, As Transcendental Clue.- x 151. The Strata of the Transcendental Constitution of the Physical Thing Supplementations.- x 152. Extension of the Problem of Transcendental Constitution to Other Regions.- x 153. The Full Extension of the Transcendental Problem The Articulation of the Investigations.- Index to Proper Names.- Analytic Subject Index.
Series: Husserliana: Edmund Husserl - Collected Works
Number Of Pages: 401
Published: 31st October 1982
Country of Publication: NL
Dimensions (cm): 25.4 x 16.51
Weight (kg): 0.89