| Preface | |
| Acknowledgments | |
| Notes on the History of the Philosophy of Science | p. 1 |
| Kant and the Kantian Tradition | p. 5 |
| Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) | p. 5 |
| William Whewell (1794-1866) | p. 13 |
| Hermann Ludwig Ferdinand von Helmholtz (1821-1894) | p. 15 |
| Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945) | p. 17 |
| Emile Meyerson (1859-1933) | p. 19 |
| The Empiricist Tradition Since Herschel and Mill | p. 22 |
| Sir John Frederick William Herschel (1792-1871) | p. 22 |
| John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) | p. 24 |
| William Stanley Jevons (1835-1882) | p. 27 |
| Karl Pearson (1857-1936) | p. 29 |
| Norman Robert Campbell (1880-1949) | p. 31 |
| Moritz Schlick (1882-1936) | p. 33 |
| Percy Williams Bridgman (1882-1961) | p. 35 |
| On the Origin of Conventionalism | p. 38 |
| Ernst Mach (1838-1916) | p. 38 |
| Emile Boutroux (1845-1921) | p. 40 |
| Heinrich Rudolf Hertz (1857-1894) | p. 42 |
| Henri Jules Poincare (1854-1912) | p. 47 |
| Pierre Maurice Marie Duhem (1861-1916) | p. 49 |
| Leading Schools and Trends in Philosophy of Science Today | p. 51 |
| Philosophy of Science: The Place of Hermeneutic Phenomenology | p. 56 |
| Hermeneutic Phenomenology on the Meaning and Function of Philosophy | p. 60 |
| Philosophy as a Critical Reflection on the Meaning of Being Which Takes its Starting Point in an Analytic of Man's Mode of Being | p. 60 |
| Philosophy and the Question Concerning the Meaning of Being | p. 60 |
| Being, Reality, and Knowledge | p. 63 |
| The Question of Being and Man | p. 65 |
| Intentionality and Being-in-the World | p. 68 |
| Hermeneutic Phenomenology Versus Idealism and Realism | p. 72 |
| Conclusion - Ontology and Analytic of Man's Being | p. 76 |
| The Historical Character of Philosophy | p. 77 |
| Philosophy as Critical Reflection on Man's Experiences | p. 85 |
| Philosophy and Non-Philosophic Forms of Man's Experience | p. 85 |
| Philosophy and Science | p. 91 |
| The Dialectic Between Philosophy and Non-Philosophic Experience | p. 94 |
| Concluding Remarks | p. 95 |
| Basic Issues for an Ontology of the Natural Sciences | p. 99 |
| On the Hermeneutic Dimensions of the Natural Sciences | p. 100 |
| Toward a Hermeneutic of the Natural Sciences | p. 104 |
| Some Reflections on the Essence of Natural Science | p. 114 |
| On the Genesis of Modern Science | p. 116 |
| How is Natural Science Present in Our World? | p. 119 |
| Some Important Implications of the Hermeneutico-Ontological Approach for Several Fundamental Issues of the Philosophy of the Natural Sciences | p. 121 |
| On the Problem of Truth in the Sciences | p. 127 |
| Some Historical Observations | p. 128 |
| The Contemporary Debate on Scientific Realism | p. 131 |
| Refutation of Scientific Realism and "Classical" Conventionalism | p. 133 |
| Critical Analysis of Constructive Empiricism | p. 137 |
| Toward a New Conception of Truth | p. 143 |
| On Myth and Science. Some Hermeneutical Reflections | p. 150 |
| Introduction: How are Myth and Natural Science to be Related to Each Other? | p. 150 |
| Myth, Philosophy, and Religion. Criticism of Myth in the Enlightenment | p. 153 |
| Science and Myth. The Paradoxical Relation Between the Two | p. 161 |
| Critical Discussion of Some Basic Issues Raised in the Logic, Epistemology, History, and Ontology of the Natural Sciences | p. 170 |
| On Stegmuller's Critical Analysis of the Logico-Empiricist Debate About the Relationship Between Theory and Experience | p. 170 |
| The Problem of Empirical Significance. Carnap's Criterion of Empirical Significance of Theoretical Terms | p. 171 |
| Critical Discussion and Conclusion | p. 187 |
| On Induction: Popper and Hempel | p. 189 |
| On the Meaning of Scientific Revolutions | p. 200 |
| Kuhn's View | p. 202 |
| Three Basic Issues | p. 209 |
| Rationalism and Modern Science | p. 209 |
| Recurrent History | p. 211 |
| Induction | p. 213 |
| Conclusion: Evolution and Revolution in Science | p. 214 |
| Reflections on Lakatos' Methodology of Scientific Research Programs | p. 217 |
| Lakatos Versus Sneed and Stegmuller | p. 218 |
| Logic, Epistemology, and Ontology of Science | p. 223 |
| Hubner on the Nature of the Theories Developed in Physics | p. 230 |
| Beyond Realism and Idealism. A Response to Patrick Heelan | p. 242 |
| Heelan's "Ontology" | p. 244 |
| On the Notion of "Reality." Beyond Realism and Idealism | p. 246 |
| Appearances or Phenomena? | p. 248 |
| Toward a Hermeneutic Theory of the History of the Natural Sciences | p. 253 |
| Three Views on the Historicity of the History of Science | p. 254 |
| Kuhn's Position in Regard to the History of Science | p. 254 |
| Lakatos' Idea of a History of Science as a Rational Reconstruction of the Past | p. 256 |
| On the Theoretical Foundation of the Historical Sciences According to Hubner | p. 261 |
| Critical Reflections | p. 266 |
| History is Not an Empirical But an Interpretive Science | p. 269 |
| The Universal in the Science "History" | p. 270 |
| History is Not a Homogeneous Domain: Different Branches of History. History of Science | p. 272 |
| On Recurrent History | p. 275 |
| Bibliography | p. 283 |
| Index of Names | p. 298 |
| Index of Terms | p. 301 |
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