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Heuristics and Biases : The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment - Thomas Gilovich

Heuristics and Biases

The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment

By: Thomas Gilovich (Editor), Dale Griffin (Editor), Daniel Kahneman (Editor)

Paperback Published: 26th November 2002
ISBN: 9780521796798
Number Of Pages: 882

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Judgment pervades human experience. Do I have a strong enough case to go to trial? Will the Fed change interest rates? Can I trust this person? This book examines how people answer such questions. How do people cope with the complexities of the world economy, the uncertain behavior of friends and adversaries, or their own changing tastes and personalities? When are people's judgments prone to bias, and what is responsible for their biases? This book compiles psychologists' best attempts to answer these important questions.

Industry Reviews

Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment; offers a massive, state-of-the-art treatment of the literature, supplementing a similar book published two decades ago...This is an impressive book, full of implications for law and policy." Cass Sunstein, University of Chicago Law School "...the book should serve well as a reference work for researchers in cognitive science and as a textbook for advanced courses in that difficult topic. Philosophers interested in cognitive science will also wish to consult it." Metapsychology Online Review "Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment is a scholarly treat, one that is sure to shape the perspectives of another generation of researchers, teachers, and graduate students. The book will serve as a welcome refresher course for some readers and a strong introduction to an important research perspective for others." Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology

List of Contributorsp. xi
Prefacep. xv
Introduction - Heuristics and Biases: Then and Nowp. 1
Theoretical and Empirical Extensions
Representativeness and Availability
Extensional versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgmentp. 19
Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgmentp. 49
How Alike Is It? versus How Likely Is It?: A Disjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgmentsp. 82
Imagining Can Heighten or Lower the Perceived Likelihood of Contracting a Disease: The Mediating Effect of Ease of Imageryp. 98
The Availability Heuristic Revisited: Ease of Recall and Content of Recall as Distinct Sources of Informationp. 103
Anchoring, Contamination, and Compatibility
Incorporating the Irrelevant: Anchors in Judgments of Belief and Valuep. 120
Putting Adjustment Back in the Anchoring and Adjustment Heuristicp. 139
Self-Anchoring in Conversation: Why Language Users Do Not Do What They "Should"p. 150
Inferential Correctionp. 167
Mental Contamination and the Debiasing Problemp. 185
Sympathetic Magical Thinking: The Contagion and Similarity "Heuristics"p. 201
Compatibility Effects in Judgment and Choicep. 217
Forecasting, Confidence, and Calibration
The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of Confidencep. 230
Inside the Planning Fallacy: The Causes and Consequences of Optimistic Time Predictionsp. 250
Probability Judgment across Culturesp. 271
Durability Bias in Affective Forecastingp. 292
Resistance of Personal Risk Perceptions to Debiasing Interventionsp. 313
Ambiguity and Self-Evaluation: The Role of Idiosyncratic Trait Definitions in Self-Serving Assessments of Abilityp. 324
When Predictions Fail: The Dilemma of Unrealistic Optimismp. 334
Norms and Counterfactuals
Norm Theory: Comparing Reality to Its Alternativesp. 348
Counterfactual Thought, Regret, and Superstition: How to Avoid Kicking Yourselfp. 367
New Theoretical Directions
Two Systems of Reasoning
Two Systems of Reasoningp. 379
The Affect Heuristicp. 397
Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the Rationality Debate?p. 421
Support Theory
Support Theory: A Nonextensional Representation of Subjective Probabilityp. 441
Unpacking, Repacking, and Anchoring: Advances in Support Theoryp. 474
Remarks on Support Theory: Recent Advances and Future Directionsp. 489
Alternative Perspectives on Heuristics
The Use of Statistical Heuristics in Everyday Inductive Reasoningp. 510
Feelings as Information: Moods Influence Judgments and Processing Strategiesp. 534
Automated Choice Heuristicsp. 548
How Good Are Fast and Frugal Heuristics?p. 559
Intuitive Politicians, Theologians, and Prosecutors: Exploring the Empirical Implications of Deviant Functionalist Metaphorsp. 582
Real-World Applications
Everyday Judgment and Behavior
The Hot Hand in Basketball: on the Misperception of Random Sequencesp. 601
Like Goes with Like: The Role of Representativeness in Erroneous and Pseudo-Scientific Beliefsp. 617
When Less Is More: Counterfactual Thinking and Satisfaction among Olympic Medalistsp. 625
Understanding Misunderstanding: Social Psychological Perspectivesp. 636
Expert Judgment
Assessing Uncertainty in Physical Constantsp. 666
Do Analysts Overreact?p. 678
The Calibration of Expert Judgment: Heuristics and Biases Beyond the Laboratoryp. 686
Clinical versus Actuarial Judgmentp. 716
Heuristics and Biases in Applicationp. 730
Theory-Driven Reasoning about Plausible Pasts and Probable Futures in World Politicsp. 749
Referencesp. 763
Indexp. 855
Table of Contents provided by Syndetics. All Rights Reserved.

ISBN: 9780521796798
ISBN-10: 0521796792
Audience: Professional
Format: Paperback
Language: English
Number Of Pages: 882
Published: 26th November 2002
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Country of Publication: GB
Dimensions (cm): 22.8 x 15.2  x 4.6
Weight (kg): 1.25