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Game Theory for Political Scientists - James D. Morrow

Game Theory for Political Scientists

Hardcover

Published: 19th December 1994
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Game theory is the mathematical analysis of strategic interaction. In the fifty years since the appearance of von Neumann and Morgenstern's classic "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior" (Princeton, 1944), game theory has been widely applied to problems in economics. Until recently, however, its usefulness in political science has been underappreciated, in part because of the technical difficulty of the methods developed by economists. James Morrow's book is the first to provide a standard text adapting contemporary game theory to political analysis. It uses a minimum of mathematics to teach the essentials of game theory and contains problems and their solutions suitable for advanced undergraduate and graduate students in all branches of political science.

Morrow begins with classical utility and game theory and ends with current research on repeated games and games of incomplete information. The book focuses on noncooperative game theory and its application to international relations, political economy, and American and comparative politics. Special attention is given to models of four topics: bargaining, legislative voting rules, voting in mass elections, and deterrence. An appendix reviews relevant mathematical techniques. Brief bibliographic essays at the end of each chapter suggest further readings, graded according to difficulty. This rigorous but accessible introduction to game theory will be of use not only to political scientists but also to psychologists, sociologists, and others in the social sciences.

"James Morrow's superb book provides the best account of ideas from game theory tailored to the interests of political scientists, which is currently available."--The Times Higher Education Supplement

List of Figures and Tables
Preface and Acknowledgments
Overviewp. 1
What Is Game Theory?p. 1
What Can You Do with Game Theory?p. 2
Four Problems in Political Sciencep. 3
Why Model?p. 6
The Rational Choice Approach to Social Modelingp. 7
Utility Theoryp. 16
The Concept of Rationalityp. 17
How Do Utility Functions Predict Actions?p. 22
An Example: Nixon's Christmas Bombingp. 25
Certainty, Risk, and Uncertaintyp. 28
Utility Theory under the Condition of Riskp. 29
Some Common Misconceptions about Utility Theoryp. 33
Utility Functions and Types of Preferencesp. 34
A Simple Example: The Calculus of Deterrencep. 38
Another Simple Example: The Decision to Votep. 43
Why Might Utility Theory Not Work?p. 44
Specifying a Gamep. 51
Formalizing a Situation: Deterrence in the Cuban Missile Crisisp. 51
Games in Extensive Formp. 58
Games in Strategic Formp. 65
Classical Game Theoryp. 73
Defining the Terms of Classical Game Theoryp. 74
Domination, Best Replies, and Equilibriump. 77
Mixed Strategiesp. 81
The Minmax Theorem and Equilibria of Two-Person, Zero-Sum Gamesp. 89
Characteristics of Nash Equilibriap. 91
Nash Equilibria and Common Conjecturesp. 94
Rationalizabilityp. 98
Political Reform in Democraciesp. 101
Candidate Competition in the Spatial Model of Electionsp. 104
A Very Brief Introduction to Cooperative Game Theoryp. 111
Solving Extensive-Form Games: Backwards Induction and Subgame Perfectionp. 121
Backwards Inductionp. 124
Subgame Perfectionp. 128
Sophisticated Votingp. 133
Agenda Controlp. 135
Legislative Rules and Structure-Induced Equilibriap. 138
The Rubinstein Bargaining Modelp. 145
Bargaining in Legislaturesp. 149
Why Might Backwards Induction Yield Counterintuitive Results?p. 156
Beliefs and Perfect Bayesian Equilibriap. 161
Bayes's Theoremp. 163
The Preference for Biased Informationp. 166
Perfect Bayesian Equilibriap. 170
Nuclear Deterrencep. 180
More on Noncooperative Equilibrium: Perfect and Sequential Equilibriap. 188
Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategiesp. 189
Perfect Equilibriump. 192
Sequential Equilibriump. 196
Deterrence and the Signaling of Resolvep. 199
"Why Vote?" Reduxp. 212
Games of Limited Information and Restrictions on Beliefsp. 219
Signaling Gamesp. 222
The Informational Role of Congressional Committeesp. 227
Bargaining under Incomplete Informationp. 237
Deterrence and Out-of-Equilibrium Beliefsp. 241
An Introduction to Restrictions on Beliefsp. 244
"Cheap Talk" and Coordinationp. 250
Repeated Gamesp. 260
Thinking about Repetition: Iterated Prisoner's Dilemmap. 262
Folk Theoremsp. 268
Finite Repeated Games: The Chain Store Paradoxp. 279
Stationarityp. 291
Retrospective Voting and Electoral Controlp. 293
Conclusion: Where Do We Go from Here?p. 302
How Do Formal Models Increase Our Knowledge?p. 302
The Weaknesses of Game Theoryp. 305
How Does One Build a Model?p. 311
Appendix 1: Basic Mathematical Knowledgep. 315
Algebrap. 315
Set Theoryp. 318
Relations and Functionsp. 320
Probability Theoryp. 320
Limitsp. 322
Differential Calculusp. 323
Partial Derivatives and Lagrange Multipliersp. 327
Integral Calculusp. 329
The Idea of a Mathematical Proofp. 331
Answers to Selected Problemsp. 333
Notesp. 345
Glossary of Terms in Game Theoryp. 349
Bibliographyp. 355
Indexp. 365
Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved.

ISBN: 9780691034300
ISBN-10: 0691034303
Audience: Tertiary; University or College
Format: Hardcover
Language: English
Number Of Pages: 400
Published: 19th December 1994
Country of Publication: US
Dimensions (cm): 24.6 x 15.6  x 3.3
Weight (kg): 0.73