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Game Theory : Game Theory - Drew Fudenberg

Hardcover

Published: 1st October 1991
For Ages: 18+ years old
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This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory - including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games, and games of incomplete information - in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. The analytic material is accompanied by many applications, examples, and exercises.The theory of noncooperative games studies the behavior of agents in any situation where each agent's optimal choice may depend on a forecast of the opponents' choices. "Noncooperative" refers to choices that are based on the participant's perceived selfinterest. Although game theory has been applied to many fields, Fudenberg and Tirole focus on the kinds of game theory that have been most useful in the study of economic problems. They also include some applications to political science. The fourteen chapters are grouped in parts that cover static games of complete information, dynamic games of complete information, static games of incomplete information, dynamic games of incomplete information, and advanced topics.Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole are Professors of Economics at MIT.

"Fudenberg and Tirole's text will have an immediate and important impact on the way game theory is taught at the graduate level. Not only does it cover most of the central topics in noncooperative game theory, it is as up-to-date and complete as a book in this area could hope to be." Charles Wilson , Professor of Economics, New York University

Acknowledgmentsp. xv
Introductionp. xvii
Static Games of Complete Information
Games in Strategic Form and Nash Equilibriump. 3
Introduction to Games in Strategic Form and Iterated Strict Dominancep. 4
Nash Equilibriump. 11
Existence and Properties of Nash Equilibriap. 29
Exercisesp. 36
Referencesp. 42
Iterated Strict Dominance, Rationalizability, and Correlated Equilibriump. 45
Iterated Strict Dominance and Rationalizabilityp. 45
Correlated Equilibriump. 53
Rationalizability and Subjective Correlated Equilibriap. 59
Dynamic Games of Complete Information
Extensive-Form Gamesp. 67
Introductionp. 67
Commitment and Perfection in Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actionsp. 70
The Extensive Formp. 77
Strategies and Equilibria in Extensive-Form Gamesp. 83
Backward Induction and Subgame Perfectionp. 92
Critiques of Backward Induction and Subgame Perfectionp. 96
Exercisesp. 100
Referencesp. 105
Applications of Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actionsp. 107
Introductionp. 107
The Principle of Optimality and Subgame Perfectionp. 108
A First Look at Repeated Gamesp. 110
The Rubenstein-Stahl Bargaining Modelp. 113
Simple Timing Gamesp. 117
Iterated Conditional Dominance and the Rubenstein Bargaining Gamep. 128
Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibriap. 130
Finite-Horizon and Infinite-Horizon Equilibriap. 134
Exercisesp. 138
Referencesp. 141
Repeated Gamesp. 145
Repeated Games with Observable Actionsp. 146
Finitely Repeated Gamesp. 165
Repeated Games with Varying Opponentsp. 168
Pareto Perfection and Renegotiation-Proofness in Repeated Gamesp. 174
Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Informationp. 182
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Informationp. 192
Changing the Information Structure with the Time Periodp. 197
Exercisesp. 200
Referencesp. 203
Static Games of Incomplete Information
Bayesian Games and Bayesian Equilibriump. 209
Incomplete Informationp. 209
Example 6.1: Providing a Public Good under Incomplete Informationp. 211
The Notions of Type and Strategyp. 213
Bayesian Equilibriump. 215
Further Examples of Bayesian Equilibriump. 215
Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategiesp. 226
Using Bayesian Equilibria to Justify Mixed Equilibriap. 230
The Distributional Approachp. 234
Exercisesp. 237
Referencesp. 241
Bayesian Games and Mechanical Designp. 243
Examples of Mechanical Designp. 246
Mechanism Design and the Revelation Principlep. 253
Mechanism Design with a Single Agentp. 258
Mechanisms with Several Agents: Feasible Allocations, Budget Balance, and Efficiencyp. 268
Mechanism Design with Several Agents: Optimizationp. 284
Further Topics in Mechanism Designp. 292
Appendixp. 303
Exercisesp. 308
Referencesp. 314
Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information
Equilibrium Refinements: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, Sequential Equilibrium, and Trembling-Hand Perfectionp. 321
Introductionp. 321
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Multi-Stage Games of Incomplete Informationp. 324
Extensive-Form Refinementsp. 336
Strategic-Form Refinementsp. 350
Appendixp. 359
Exercisesp. 360
Referencesp. 364
Reputation Effectsp. 367
Introductionp. 367
Games with a Single Long-Run Playerp. 369
Games with a Many Long-Run Playersp. 384
A Single "Big" Player against Many Simultaneous Long-Lived Opponentsp. 389
Exercisesp. 391
Referencesp. 394
Sequential Bargaining under Incomplete Informationp. 397
Introductionp. 397
Intertemporal Price Discrimination: The Single-Sale Modelp. 400
Intertemporal Price Discrimination: The Rental or Repeated-Sale Modelp. 416
Price Offers by and Informed Buyerp. 421
Exercisesp. 428
Referencesp. 432
Advanced Topics
More Equilibrium Refinements: Stability, Forward Induction, and Iterated Weak Dominancep. 437
Strategic Stabilityp. 437
Signaling Gamesp. 446
Forward Induction, Iterated Weak Dominance, and "Burning Money"p. 460
Robust Predictions under Payoffs Uncertaintyp. 467
Exercisesp. 473
Referencesp. 475
Advanced Topics in Strategic-Form Gamesp. 479
Generic Properties of Nash Equilibriap. 479
Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Games with Continuous Action Spaces and Discontinuous Payoffsp. 484
Supermodular Gamesp. 489
Exercisesp. 497
Referencesp. 498
Payoff-Relevant Strategies and Markov Equilibriump. 501
Markov Equilibria in Specific Classes of Gamesp. 503
Markov Perfect Equilibrium in General Games: Definition and Propertiesp. 513
Differential Gamesp. 520
Capital-Accumulation Gamesp. 528
Exercisesp. 536
Referencesp. 537
Common Knowledge and Gamesp. 541
Introductionp. 541
Knowledge and Common Knowledgep. 542
Common Knowledge and Equilibriump. 546
Common Knowledge, Almost Common Knowledge, and the Sensitivity of Equilibria to the Information Structurep. 554
Exercisesp. 570
Referencesp. 571
Indexp. 573
Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved.

ISBN: 9780262061414
ISBN-10: 0262061414
Series: Game Theory
Audience: Professional
For Ages: 18+ years old
Format: Hardcover
Language: English
Number Of Pages: 604
Published: 1st October 1991
Publisher: MIT Press Ltd
Country of Publication: US
Dimensions (cm): 25.4 x 18.5  x 3.6
Weight (kg): 1.34