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Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining - Alvin E. Roth

Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining

By: Alvin E. Roth (Editor)

Hardcover Published: 10th December 2003
ISBN: 9780521267571
Number Of Pages: 404

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Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory. It especially shows the way the use of axiomatic models has been complemented by the new results derived from strategic models. The papers in this volume are edited versions of those given at a conference on Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining held at the University of Pittsburgh. There are two distinct reasons why the study of bargaining is of fundamental importance in economics. The first is that many aspects of economic activity are directly influenced by bargaining between and among individuals, firms, and nations. The second is that bargaining occupies an important place in economic theory, since the 'pure bargaining problem' is at the opposite pole of economic phenomena from the case of 'perfect competition'. This volume is an outgrowth of the renewed interest in the strategic approach to the theory of bargaining and to the general theory of non-cooperative games.

Preface
Editor-s Introduction and overview
Disagreement in bargaining: models with incomplete information
Reputations in games and markets
An approach to some noncooperative game situations with special attention to bargaining
Infinite-horizon models of bargaining with one-sided incomplete information
Choice of conjectures in a bargaining game with incomplete information
Analysis of two bargaining problems with incomplete information
Sequential bargaining mechanisms
The role of risk aversion in a simple bargaining model
Risk sensitivity and related properties for bargaining solutions
Axiomatic theory of bargaining with a variable population: a survey of recent results
Toward a focal-point theory of bargaining
Bargaining and coalitions
Axiomatic approaches to coalitional bargaining
A comment on the Coase theorem
Disclosure of evidence and resolution of disputes: who should bear the burden of proof?
The role of arbitration and the theory of incentives
Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved.

ISBN: 9780521267571
ISBN-10: 0521267579
Audience: Professional
Format: Hardcover
Language: English
Number Of Pages: 404
Published: 10th December 2003
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Country of Publication: GB
Dimensions (cm): 22.8 x 15.2  x 2.7
Weight (kg): 0.76