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Game Equilibrium Models : Game Equilibrium Models II Methods, Morals and Markets II - Reinhard Selten

Game Equilibrium Models

Game Equilibrium Models II Methods, Morals and Markets II

By: Reinhard Selten (Editor)

Hardcover

Published: 16th August 1991
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This paper represents the collaborative work of a game theorist and a policy analyst in an attempt to examine severa! questions that go to the hearl of the way individuala achieve social order. The capacity of any individual to undertake long-term, productive activities that affect and are affected by the actiona of other individuala dependa upon gaining a minimallevel of predictability among those involved. No one could successfully drive to work if the behavior of other drivera were noi relatively predictable. No one could operate a stare, if potential consumers did not purcha. se, rather than stea!, the commodities offered to the public. No one would ma. ke a. ny investments other than those tha. t would be made by a solitary individual in an isolated setting (the cla. ssic Robinson Crusoe situation). One of the ways that individuals achieve predictability in social arrangements is to a. gree to follow a set of normative prescriptions a. bout what they must, must not, or may do. Agreeing to a set of prescriptions is relatively easy. Actually following those prescriptions over time when temptations arise offering potentially high payoffs, is not at all easy. In natural settings, individUala follow agreed upon prescriptions to a greater or lesser extent depending on enforcement levels. A frequent assumption made by policy ana. lysts a. nd game theorists is tha. t enforcement is externa! to the situa. tion under analysis. That a.

Majority Voting in the Condorcet Paradox as a Problem of Equilibrium Selection
Does Concession Always Prevent Pressure?
The Distribution of Foreign Language Skills as a Game Equilibrium
Resisting the Draft. A Perfect Equilibrium Approach
Altruism in Social Dilemmas - Failure to Catch it in a Parameter
The Strategy of Challenges: Two Beheading Games in a Medieval Literature
Balance of Power in a Parlor Game
Modelling Alliance Formation: A Noncooperative Approach
The (Stability of the) Western Defense Alliance
A Game Theoretic Analysis
Implications of the Defense Efficiency Hypothesis for the Choice of Military Force Structures
Games With and Without Complete Information About the Antagonist's Intentions
A Sequential Game Including the Possibility of Restructuring Forces
Inspector Leadership With Incomplete Information
Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved.

ISBN: 9783540542261
ISBN-10: 3540542264
Audience: Professional
Format: Hardcover
Language: English
Number Of Pages: 369
Published: 16th August 1991
Publisher: Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg Gmbh & Co. Kg
Country of Publication: DE
Dimensions (cm): 24.4 x 17.0  x 2.2
Weight (kg): 1.58