
Equilibrium, Markets and Dynamics
Essays in Honour of Claus Weddepohl
By: Cars H. Hommes (Editor), Roald Ramer (Editor), Cees A. Withagen (Editor)
Hardcover | 14 May 2002
At a Glance
364 Pages
23.5 x 15.88 x 1.91
Hardcover
$169.75
or 4 interest-free payments of $42.44 with
orShips in 7 to 10 business days
Industry Reviews
| Claus Weddepohl: the First Dutch Mathematical Economist | p. 1 |
| Introduction | p. 1 |
| Axiomatic Choice Theory | p. 3 |
| General Competitive Equilibrium | p. 5 |
| Non-Walrasian Equilibria | p. 8 |
| Overlapping Generations | p. 9 |
| Markets | p. 10 |
| Price Dynamics | p. 13 |
| Final Remarks | p. 15 |
| Publication of H.N. Weddepohl | p. 16 |
| Equilibrium | p. 19 |
| Indeterminateness of Equilibria and Macroeconomics | p. 21 |
| Introduction and Preview | p. 21 |
| Two Extensions of the Arrow-Debreu Model | p. 24 |
| Combining Money and Price Rigidities | p. 28 |
| Elementary Dynamics | p. 29 |
| Incomplete-Markets Heuristics | p. 32 |
| References | p. 35 |
| Equilibrium Properties of Status Seeking and Conformism | p. 37 |
| Introduction | p. 37 |
| Status Seeking and Conformism Revisited | p. 40 |
| Final Remarks | p. 48 |
| References | p. 49 |
| Recent Criticism of General Equilibrium Theory | p. 51 |
| Introduction | p. 51 |
| Walker and General Equilibrium | p. 51 |
| Critical Evaluation | p. 54 |
| Further Development of General Equilibrium Theory | p. 57 |
| References | p. 58 |
| Coordinating Thoughts on Coordination Failures | p. 61 |
| Introduction | p. 61 |
| Coordination Games | p. 63 |
| Strategic Models of Coordination Failures | p. 65 |
| Strategic Models of Coordination Failures with a Coordinating Role for Prices | p. 68 |
| General Equilibrium Models of Coordination Failures | p. 72 |
| Conclusion | p. 74 |
| References | p. 75 |
| Dynamic Implementation of Competitive Equilibria in Renegotiation Proof Equilibrium | p. 77 |
| Introduction | p. 77 |
| Economies over Time and Dynamic Mechanisms | p. 78 |
| Nash Implementation and Folk Theorems | p. 82 |
| Implementation in Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium | p. 85 |
| Implementation in Renegotiation Proof Equilibrium | p. 87 |
| References | p. 89 |
| On the Economics of Managing and Returns to Communications Technology | p. 91 |
| Introduction | p. 91 |
| The Model | p. 92 |
| The Path of st | p. 93 |
| The Characteristics of the Organization | p. 97 |
| Discussion | p. 99 |
| The Continuous Case | p. 99 |
| References | p. 101 |
| Dynamic Adjustment of Supply Constrained Disequilibria to Walrasian Equilibrium | p. 103 |
| Introduction | p. 103 |
| The Model | p. 107 |
| The Equilibrating Mechanism | p. 108 |
| Connected Set of Disequilibria | p. 110 |
| The Dynamics of the Adjustment Process | p. 113 |
| References | p. 115 |
| A General Equilibrium of Managed Services | p. 117 |
| Introduction | p. 117 |
| The Service Opportunity Structure | p. 120 |
| The Governance Structure | p. 128 |
| An Economy with Marketable Stratified Services | p. 133 |
| References | p. 138 |
| Markets | p. 141 |
| Undesired Goods in Applied Demand Analysis | p. 143 |
| Introduction | p. 143 |
| An Example | p. 145 |
| A Formalization | p. 147 |
| Possible Extensions | p. 152 |
| References | p. 153 |
| Animal Communication | p. 155 |
| Still Searching for Bertrand Equilibrium | p. 167 |
| Introduction | p. 167 |
| Variations on Bertrand's Theme | p. 169 |
| Differentiation, Timing and Cooperation | p. 174 |
| Behavior | p. 178 |
| Conclusion | p. 180 |
| References | p. 181 |
| Environmental Policy and Bertrand Competition: a General Equilibrium Approach | p. 183 |
| Introduction | p. 183 |
| The Model | p. 184 |
| Perfect Competition, Monopoly and Cournot Oligopoly | p. 185 |
| Bertrand Oligopoly: Partial Equilibrium | p. 187 |
| Bertrand Oligopoly: General Equilibrium | p. 189 |
| Conclusion | p. 194 |
| References | p. 195 |
| Retiring Rich | p. 197 |
| The Usual Suspects | p. 198 |
| Everyone Pays, Claus Gains | p. 202 |
| Afterthoughts and Future Plans | p. 204 |
| References | p. 207 |
| Scope for Defined Contribution | p. 209 |
| Introduction | p. 209 |
| Model | p. 211 |
| Results | p. 214 |
| Discussion | p. 215 |
| Concluding Remarks | p. 217 |
| References | p. 217 |
| Dynamics | p. 219 |
| On the Possibility of Economic Dynamics | p. 221 |
| An Example of Equilibrium Dynamics | p. 221 |
| Disequilibrium Dynamics | p. 223 |
| Disequilibrium Dynamics in the Theory of Growth | p. 227 |
| A Brief Digression | p. 229 |
| Summing Up | p. 229 |
| References | p. 230 |
| A Bifurcation in an Overlapping Generations Model | p. 231 |
| Introduction | p. 231 |
| The Model | p. 232 |
| Existence | p. 237 |
| Bifurcations | p. 238 |
| Conclusions | p. 243 |
| References | p. 243 |
| Heterogeneous Beliefs and Routes to Complex Dynamics in Asset Pricing Models with Price Contingent Contracts | p. 245 |
| Introduction | p. 245 |
| The Model | p. 249 |
| A Simple Example | p. 254 |
| General Comments and Discussion | p. 263 |
| References | p. 264 |
| Why Are There Nowadays only a Few Articles on Matrices in Economic Journals? | p. 267 |
| Introduction | p. 267 |
| Stability in an Exchange Economy | p. 268 |
| Stability in Cournot Oligopoly | p. 275 |
| Final Remarks | p. 279 |
| References | p. 279 |
| Learning in Networks | p. 283 |
| Introduction | p. 283 |
| Network Structure and Technological Change | p. 284 |
| Network Formation | p. 287 |
| Concluding Remarks | p. 291 |
| References | p. 292 |
| Imitation of Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma Games with Some Local Interaction | p. 293 |
| Introduction | p. 293 |
| The Models | p. 295 |
| Imitating the Best Behavior | p. 298 |
| Imitating the Best Agent | p. 302 |
| Conclusion | p. 303 |
| Appendix | p. 303 |
| References | p. 305 |
| Bubbles and Long Range Dependence in Asset Prices Volatilities | p. 307 |
| Introduction | p. 307 |
| A Simple Theoretical Model | p. 311 |
| Simulations and Testing | p. 317 |
| Conclusion | p. 323 |
| References | p. 324 |
| Nonlinear Dynamics and the Stability of Competitive Equilibria | p. 329 |
| Introduction | p. 329 |
| The Tâtonnement Process | p. 330 |
| Complicated Dynamics in the Tâtonnement Process | p. 332 |
| Towards a More Realistic Adjustment Process | p. 338 |
| Concluding Remarks | p. 342 |
| References | p. 343 |
| Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved. |
ISBN: 9783540434702
ISBN-10: 3540434704
Published: 14th May 2002
Format: Hardcover
Language: English
Number of Pages: 364
Audience: Professional and Scholarly
Publisher: Springer Nature B.V.
Country of Publication: DE
Dimensions (cm): 23.5 x 15.88 x 1.91
Weight (kg): 0.65
Shipping
| Standard Shipping | Express Shipping | |
|---|---|---|
| Metro postcodes: | $9.99 | $14.95 |
| Regional postcodes: | $9.99 | $14.95 |
| Rural postcodes: | $9.99 | $14.95 |
Orders over $79.00 qualify for free shipping.
How to return your order
At Booktopia, we offer hassle-free returns in accordance with our returns policy. If you wish to return an item, please get in touch with Booktopia Customer Care.
Additional postage charges may be applicable.
Defective items
If there is a problem with any of the items received for your order then the Booktopia Customer Care team is ready to assist you.
For more info please visit our Help Centre.
























