A central focus of work in epistemology over the past twenty-five years has been the debate between internalism and externalism. At issue is the very form of an epistemological theory, and with it, competing conceptions of the epistemological enterprise. Internalists hold that the factors which make a belief justified must in some sense be internal to the agent: for example, they must be cognitively or introspectively available. Externalists deny this, holding instead that the features which make a belief justified may include such things as the reliability of the process by which the belief is formed, features which need not be available to the agent. This book brings together the essays which have defined and advanced this debate. It includes work by William P. Alston, Laurence BonJour, Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, Richard Foley, Alvin Goldman, Hilary Kornblith, Frederick Schmitt, Ernest Sosa, and Barry Stroud.
"The essays in this excellent collection provide the basis for an understanding of the current debate between externalist and internalist accounts of justification. A must-have for anyone wishing to come to grips with the central issues in epistemology." Peter Klein, Rutgers University
Internalism and Externalism: A Brief Historical Introduction: Hilary Kornblith.
1. Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge: Laurence BonJour.
2. The Internalist Conception of Justification: Alvin Goldman.
3. Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology: William P. Alston.
4. How Internal Can You Get?: Hilary Kornblith.
5. Understanding Human Knowledge in General: Barry Stroud.
6. Reliabilism and Intellectual Virtue: Ernest Sosa.
7. What Am I to Believe?: Richard Foley.
8. Epistemic Perspectivism: Frederick Schmitt.
9. Internalism Exposed: Alvin Goldman.
10. Internalism Defended: Earl Conee and Richard Feldman.
Series: Blackwell Readings in Philosophy
Number Of Pages: 271
Published: 8th October 2001
Publisher: BLACKWELL PUBL
Country of Publication: GB
Dimensions (cm): 23.93 x 14.99 x 2.26
Weight (kg): 0.43
Edition Number: 1