Duty and Inclination The Fundamentals of Morality Discussed and Redefined with Special Regard to Kant and Schiller

I. Duty and Inclination.- x 1 Introduction.- A Ethico-Historical and Critical Part.- 1. Kants Systems of Ethics in Its Relation to Schiller's Ethical Views.- x 2 Some Main Features of Kant's Ethics.- x 3 The Part Feeling Plays in Morality.- x 4 Schiller's Views on Kant's Ethics.- x 5 Kant's Answer to Schiller.- x 6 Were Kant and Schiller Really of One Mind?.- x 7 The Question Whether Kant or Schiller was Right.- 2: A Critique of the Groundwork of Kant's Ethics.- x 8 A Preliminary Discussion of the Relevance of Questions about Method to a Critique of a Philosophical System.- x 9 The Method of Kant's Ethics and the Extreme Limit He Sets on Our Ethics Insight.- x 10 A Critique of the Method of Kant's Ethics.- x 11 Some Main Points of a Critique of Kant's System of Ethics.- 1. The Moral Good as the Good in Itself.- x 12 Some Main Points of a Critique of Kant's System of Ethics.- 2. The Moral Law and Its Formula.- x 13 Some Main Points of a Critique of Kant's System of Ethics.- 3. Morality and Freedom.- B Systematic Part.- 3: The Method Required in Ethics.- x 14 The Part that Experience and Induction Play in the Method of Ethics.- x 15 The Method and Task of Ethics.- x 16 Ethics' Method Applied.- 4: The Origins of the Moral Ought and Its Relations to Inclination and Willing.- x 17 The Phenomena of Consciousness of the Moral Ought.- x 18 The Place of Conscience in the Human Personality and in Human Freedom.- x 19 The Nature and Concept of Willing. Willing as a Judgement by the Will and the Ought-to-Be.- x 20 Judgements by the Will, Striving and Inclination. The Objectivity of the Ought-to-Be and the Concept of Value.- x 21 Critical Excursus: The Relations of Heidegger and Thomism to the Concept and Datum of Value.- x 22 The Origin of the Ought-to-Do (Ought-to-Conduct-Oneself- so) from the Objective Ought-to-Be. A Sense of esponsibility and a Sense of Honor as the Corresponding Subjective Sources.- x 23 The Moral Ought in Its Primary, Axionomic (Not Fully Autonomous) Form.- x 24 The Secondary Non-Autonomous Moral Ought, Which is Grounded on a Relation to an Authority.- x 25 On the Question Whether There are Non-Strict Moral Demands and a Sphere of the Morally Permissible.- x 26 Corroborations of the Objectivity of Conscience. The Autonomization of the Axionomic Moral Ought.- x 27 Structures and Effects Intrinsic to the Autonomous Moral Ought.- x 28 The Relation of a Sense of Honor to an Autonomized Consciousness of the Ought.- x 29 Duty and Inclination: Moral Obligation and Volition.- x 30 The Natures of the Moral Good and Evil, Especially in Their Relation to the Moral Ought.- x 31 The Morality of Conduct (Sittlichkeit des Verhaltens) and the Morality of Being (Sittlichkeit des Seins).- x 32 The First Fundamentals of Morality.- II. On the Adaption of the Phenomenological Method to, and Its Refinement as a Method of, Ethics. (Zeitschrift fur Philo- sophische Forschung 29 (1975), pp. 108-117.).- III. Is Value Ethics Out of Date? (Zeitschrift fur Philosophische Forschung 30 (1976), pp. 93-98.).- IV. The Golden Rule and Natural Law. (Studia Leibnitiana 8 (1977), pp. 231-254.).- V. Good and Value, The Philosophical Relevance of the Concept of Value.- Name index.