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Differential Information Economies : Studies in Economic Theory - Dionysius Glycopantis

Differential Information Economies

Studies in Economic Theory

Hardcover

Published: 1st December 2004
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One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to provide Walrasian type or cooperative equilibrium concepts which have these properties. This volume contains original contributions on noncooperative and cooperative equilibrium notions in economies with differential information and provides answers to the above questions. Moreover, issues of stability, learning and continuity of alternative equilibria are also examined. 

Equilibrium concepts in differential information economiesp. 1
Information, efficiency, and the core of an economyp. 55
Information, efficiency and the core of an economy comments on Wilson's paperp. 65
The core of an economy with differential informationp. 73
An alternative proof of the nonemptiness of the private corep. 87
On the continuity of expected utilityp. 105
Market games with differential information and infinite dimensional commodity spaces : the corep. 125
A two-stage core with applications to asset markets and differential information economicsp. 135
Balancedness and the core in economies with asymmetric informationp. 157
Competitive and core allocations in large economies with differential informationp. 173
Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economiesp. 185
Exchange economies with asymmetric information : competetive equilibrium and corep. 203
Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential informationp. 227
Efficiency and incentive compatibility in differential information economiesp. 249
Incentives in market games with asymmetric information : the corep. 279
Cooperative interim contract and re-contract : Chandler's M-form firmp. 297
Optimal multilateral contractsp. 319
Risk aversion and incentive compatibility with ex post information asymmetryp. 341
Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plansp. 365
Incentive compatible contractible informationp. 377
Core concepts in economies where information is almost completep. 397
On coalitional stability of anonymous interim mechanismsp. 419
Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selectionp. 441
Non-myopic learning in differential information economies the corep. 465
Cooperative games with incomplete informationp. 481
The value allocation of an economy with differential informationp. 507
Existence and properties of a value allocation for an economy with differential informationp. 527
The bargaining set of a large economy with differential informationp. 541
Coalition structure values in differential information economies : is unity a strength?p. 553
Coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation in differential information economiesp. 567
An extensive form interpretation of the private corep. 593
On extensive form implementation of contracts in differential information economiesp. 619
Table of Contents provided by Blackwell. All Rights Reserved.

ISBN: 9783540214243
ISBN-10: 3540214240
Series: Studies in Economic Theory
Audience: Tertiary; University or College
Format: Hardcover
Language: English
Number Of Pages: 650
Published: 1st December 2004
Publisher: Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg Gmbh & Co. Kg
Country of Publication: DE
Dimensions (cm): 23.5 x 15.5  x 4.45
Weight (kg): 2.47