List of figures | p. xi |
List of tables | p. xii |
List of boxes | p. xiv |
Acknowledgements | p. xv |
Introduction | p. 1 |
Summary of the argument and the main findings | p. 3 |
Outline of the book | p. 6 |
Lessons for political science and European politics | p. 8 |
Development of the European Parliament | p. 12 |
Powers of the European Parliament | p. 12 |
Power to control the executive: a hybrid model | p. 13 |
Power to make legislation: from a lobbyist to a co-legislator | p. 18 |
Political parties in the European Parliament: a 'two-plus-several' party system | p. 21 |
The electoral disconnection | p. 26 |
The dataset: roll-call votes in the European Parliament | p. 29 |
Conclusion | p. 31 |
Democracy, transaction costs and political parties | p. 32 |
Citizen-delegate democracy | p. 33 |
Party-based democracy | p. 37 |
Parties in legislative politics and the making of public policy | p. 39 |
Parties and electoral politics | p. 46 |
Parliaments without strong parties: a history of failure | p. 49 |
Implications for the European Parliament | p. 50 |
Conclusion | p. 53 |
Ideological not territorial politics | p. 54 |
Political conflict, indivisibilities, externalities and redistribution | p. 55 |
Solving political conflicts | p. 57 |
The cleavage theory of democratic politics | p. 63 |
Implications for the European Parliament | p. 66 |
Conclusion | p. 68 |
Decentralised governance to territorial entities and sectors | p. 69 |
Participation | p. 72 |
Participation in the European Parliament: The costs and benefits of voting | p. 74 |
Variations in participation rates across time, political group and country | p. 77 |
Explaining the patterns | p. 79 |
Conclusion: politics determines participation | p. 85 |
Trends in party cohesion | p. 87 |
Theories of party cohesion | p. 88 |
Measuring cohesion in the European Parliament | p. 91 |
Main trends: growing party voting and declining national voting | p. 93 |
Determinants of party cohesion in the European Parliament | p. 95 |
Variables | p. 95 |
Results | p. 99 |
Conclusion: Growing policy-making power leads to growing party cohesion | p. 104 |
Agenda-setting and cohesion | p. 105 |
Agenda-setting and political parties | p. 108 |
The agenda cartel theory of parties | p. 108 |
Agenda-setting in the European Parliament: external and internal 'cartels' | p. 111 |
Propositions about agenda-setting and party cohesion in the European Parliament | p. 115 |
Descriptive evidence of agenda-setting and policy influence | p. 118 |
Statistical analysis | p. 121 |
Variables | p. 122 |
Results | p. 123 |
Conclusion: agenda control alone cannot explain party discipline | p. 130 |
Who controls the MEPs? | p. 132 |
MEPs: agents with two principals | p. 133 |
Voting with and against the European and national parties | p. 136 |
Analysis of MEP voting defection in the Fifth Parliament | p. 139 |
Variables | p. 139 |
Results | p. 142 |
Relative importance of European and national parties in all five parliaments | p. 143 |
Conclusion: European parties from national party actions | p. 145 |
Competition and coalition formation | p. 147 |
Theories of party competition and coalition formation | p. 148 |
Patterns of coalitions in the European Parliament | p. 150 |
Determinants of coalition formation | p. 152 |
Variables | p. 152 |
Results | p. 157 |
Conclusion: an increasingly competitive party system | p. 158 |
Dimensions of politics | p. 161 |
Dimensions of conflict in EU politics | p. 162 |
Estimating MEPs' ideal points from roll-call votes | p. 165 |
Spatial maps of the five elected European Parliaments | p. 168 |
Interpretation of the meaning of the dimensions | p. 172 |
Variables | p. 172 |
Results | p. 175 |
Conclusion: Normal politics in a territorially divided polity | p. 180 |
Investiture and censure of the Santer Commission | p. 182 |
Formation and termination of governments and the case of the EU | p. 183 |
The Santer Commission: from nomination to resignation | p. 186 |
Analysis: MEP behaviour in the investiture and censure of the Commission | p. 192 |
Variables | p. 192 |
Results | p. 195 |
Conclusion: Government-opposition politics arrives in the European Parliament | p. 198 |
The Takeover Directive | p. 200 |
A short history of the Takeover Directive | p. 201 |
Explaining MEP voting on the Takeover Directive: nationality or party? | p. 205 |
Analysis of MEP behaviour on the Takeover Directive | p. 208 |
Variables | p. 208 |
Results | p. 211 |
Conclusion: parties and ideology matter, even when national interests interfere | p. 214 |
Conclusion | p. 216 |
Bibliography | p. 221 |
Index | p. 235 |
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