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Delegating Powers : A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers - David Epstein

Delegating Powers

A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers

Paperback Published: 27th March 2000
ISBN: 9780521669603
Number Of Pages: 340

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In this path-breaking book, David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran produce the first unified theory of policy making between the legislative and executive branches. Examining major US policy initiatives from 1947 to 1992, the authors describe the conditions under which the legislature narrowly constrains executive discretion, and when it delegates authority to the bureaucracy. In doing so, the authors synthesize diverse and competitive literatures, from transaction cost and principal-agent theory in economics, to information models developed in both economics and political science, to substantive and theoretical work on legislative organization and on bureaucratic discretion.

'This is an important book, simultaneously an original argument and a synthesis of a quarter-century of work on legislative-executive relations. Using a variety of tools, ranging from juicy examples and toy models to systematic empirical analysis and formal theory, Epstein and O'Halloran have crafted a persuasive approach to the analysis of policy making in separation-of-powers regimes. It will surely influence the next generation of work.' Kenneth A. Shepsle, Harvard University 'The creativity and care with which the data in this book were collected and analyzed sets a standard for empirical political science research. Epstein and O'Halloran's combination of theory and data yields an interesting and compelling case for their interpretation of delegation. This work is state of the art political science.' David Brady, Stanford University

List of Figures and Tablesp. xii
Prefacep. xvii
Paths of Policy Making
The Politics of Military Base Closingsp. 1
Delegating Powers: The Puzzlep. 4
A Transaction Cost Politics Approachp. 7
Delegation and Broad Themes in American Politicsp. 9
Outline of the Bookp. 12
Choosing How to Decide
Legislative Organizationp. 14
Delegation and Oversightp. 18
Why Delegate?p. 29
Transaction Cost Politics
Lessons from the Theory of the Firmp. 35
A Theory of Transaction Cost Politicsp. 43
The Political Hold-up Problemp. 47
The Decision to Delegate
The Elements of Policy Makingp. 53
Equilibrium Actions and Outcomesp. 59
Testable Predictionsp. 75
Data and Postwar Trends
Data Samplep. 86
Delegation Ratiop. 90
Constraintsp. 99
Total Discretionp. 106
Postwar Trends in Executive Discretionp. 112
Delegation and Congressional-Executive Relations
Divided Government: The Debatep. 122
Discretion and Divided Governmentp. 129
Roll Calls over Delegationp. 139
Vetoes and Delegationp. 150
The Structure of Delegation: To Whom Do You Delegate?p. 151
Testing for Strategic Delegationp. 154
Implications of Divided Government for Public Policyp. 161
Delegation and Legislative Organization
Perspectives on Legislative Organizationp. 164
Committee Outliers in a System of Separate Powersp. 168
Committees, Parties, and Delegationp. 182
Legislative Procedures and Executive Discretionp. 187
Summaryp. 194
Delegation and Issue Areas
Introductionp. 196
Issues, Delegation, and Public Lawsp. 197
Issue Areas and Informationp. 206
Delegation and Distributive Politicsp. 216
Summaryp. 230
Conclusion
Summary of Resultsp. 232
The Grand Regression: Integrating Theories of American Political Institutionsp. 233
Separation of Powers in the United Statesp. 236
An Afterword on Comparative Institutions
Presidential Systemsp. 240
Parliamentary Systemsp. 242
Comparative Policy-Making Structuresp. 244
Appendices
Proofs from Formal Model in Chapter 4p. 245
Sample of Public Lawsp. 257
Sample Coding Sheetp. 267
Coding Rules for Discretionp. 273
Gridlock Interval and Other Measures of Interbranch Conflict, 1947-1992p. 285
Coding Rules for Roll-Call Votesp. 289
Committee Hearings Datap. 297
Referencesp. 301
Indexp. 313
Table of Contents provided by Syndetics. All Rights Reserved.

ISBN: 9780521669603
ISBN-10: 052166960X
Series: Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
Audience: Professional
Format: Paperback
Language: English
Number Of Pages: 340
Published: 27th March 2000
Publisher: CAMBRIDGE UNIV PR
Country of Publication: GB
Dimensions (cm): 21.59 x 14.61  x 3.18
Weight (kg): 0.43