Control and Games Models of the Greenhouse Effect : Economics Essays on the Comedy and Tragedy of the Commons

1 Introduction and Conclusions.- 2 Literature Review.- 2.1 Introduction.- 2.2 The Greenhouse Effect.- 2.2.1 Science.- 2.2.2 Emissions.- 2.2.3 Future Trends.- 2.2.4 Impacts.- 2.2.5 Policy Options for Limiting the Impacts.- 2.2.6 Policy Instruments.- 2.3 Environmental Resource Models.- 2.3.1 Introduction..- 2.3.2 Sustainability.- 2.3.3 Emission Reduction with Fixed Capital Stock.- 2.3.4 Emission Reduction and Capital Accumulation.- 2.3.5 Emission Reduction and Human Capital.- 2.4 The International Dimension.- 2.4.1 Introduction.- 2.4.2 International Pollution Games.- 2.4.3 International Environmental Cooperation.- 2.5 Summary and Conclusion.- 3 Sustainability, Emission Reduction Technology and Human Capital.- 3.1 Introduction.- 3.2 The Rudimentary Model.- 3.2.1 General Description.- 3.2.2 A Numerical Specification of the Model.- 3.2.3 Sustainability.- 3.3 Energy Related Capital.- 3.3.1 General Description of the Model.- 3.3.2 Numerical Results.- 3.4 Human Capital Accumulation.- 3.4.1 General Description.- 3.4.2 Numerical Results.- 3.4.3 The Public Good Character of Human Capital.- 3.5 Summary and Conclusions.- 4 Multi Country Modelling of the Greenhouse Effect.- 4.1 Introduction.- 4.2 Differential Game Theory.- 4.3 Energy-Related Capital in a Multi-Country Model.- 4.3.1 Open-Loop, Feedback and Joint Optimisation.- 4.4 Self-Enforcing International Cooperation.- 4.5 Renegotiation Proofness.- 4.5.1 Renegotiation Proofness in Differential Games.- 4.6 Summary and Conclusions.- 5 Cooperation in a Second-Best World: Technology Transfers and Issue Linkage.- 5.1 Introduction.- 5.2 International Cooperation and Technology Transfers.- 5.2.1 Description of the Model.- 5.2.2 The Absence of Technology Transfers.- 5.2.3 Cooperation and Non-Cooperation in the Presence of Technology Transfers.- 5.2.4 Simulation Results.- 5.3 Issue Linkage in International Environmental Problems.- 5.3.1 Introduction.- 5.3.2 The Analytical Framework for Two-By-Two Games.- 5.3.3 Linkage in Two-By-Two Games.- 5.3.4 Linkage in Differential Games.- 5.4 Summary and Conclusions.- A.- A.l Local Stability Analysis for Section 3.3.1.- A.2 Local Stability Analysis for Section 3.4.1.- B.- B.l Routine to Calculate Riccati Coefficients.- B.2 Example Worked Out.- B.3 Linear-Quadratic Case Worked Out.- B.4 Open-Loop Case.- B.5 Closed-Loop Case.- B.6 ParetoCase.- B.7 Comparison of the Open-loop, Feedback and Cooperative Case.- B.8 Renegotiation Proofness.- B.9 Specification of the Discrete Time Example.- C.- C.l Description of Feedback Solution.- C.2 Proof of Theorems on Linkage.- Literature.- List of Figures.- List of Tables.