Colin McGinn presents his latest work on consciousness in ten interlinked essays, four of them previously unpublished. He extends and deepens his controversial solution to the mind-body problem, defending the view that consciousness is both ontologically unproblematic and epistemologically impenetrable. He also investigates the basis of our knowledge that there is a mind-body problem, and the bearing of this on attempted solutions. McGinn goes on to
discuss the status of first-person authority, the possibility of atomism with respect to consciousness, extreme dualism, and the role of non-existent objects in constituting intentionality. He argues that traditional claims about our knowledge of our own mind and of the external world can be
inverted; that atomism about the conscious mind might turn out to be true; that dualism is more credible the more extreme it is; and that all intentionality involves non-existent objects. These are all surprising positions, but he contends that what the philosophy of mind needs now is 'methodological radicalism' - a willingness to consider new and seemingly extravagant ideas.
1: What Constitutes the Mind-Body Problem?
2: How Not to Solve the Mind-Body Problem
3: Solving the Philosophical Mind-Body Problem
4: What Is It Not Like to be a Brain?
5: Consciousness and Space
6: Consciousness, Atomism, and the Ancient Greeks
7: Consciousness and Cosmology: Hyperdualism Ventilated
8: The Problem of Philosophy
9: Inverted First-Person Authority
10: The Objects of Intentionality
Number Of Pages: 264
Published: 25th April 2004
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Country of Publication: GB
Dimensions (cm): 21.1 x 14.0
Weight (kg): 0.32